To begin with, Duda’s trip to Armenia already carried a certain undertone. It seems that Warsaw sought to appease Yerevan following Poland’s participation in the COP29 summit in Baku. Poland is not among Armenia’s main political or economic partners — that space is dominated by Russia, Iran, and France. Duda’s visit did not yield the signing of significant agreements or the initiation of joint projects — in essence, it was devoid of substance.
However, Duda decided to meet with members of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA), known informally as the “binocular enthusiasts.” While questionable, this meeting could still be somewhat justified; EU representatives visiting Armenia often feel obliged to engage with EUMA, the EU’s flagship project in the country.
In Azerbaijan, such visits understandably raise concerns. EUMA’s activities have clearly expanded beyond the scope initially agreed upon in Prague. Furthermore, this evolving situation has become a growing issue for the EU and its member states. Avoiding EUMA might seem awkward, but engaging with it often guarantees controversy. Duda amplified the tension by delivering a speech, widely quoted by Azerbaijani media, in which he lauded EUMA’s “success” in “calming the situation.”
This narrative, however, does not align with the reality on the ground. The reduction in border incidents is due to factors far removed from EUMA’s presence. While Russian peacekeepers operated in parts of Karabakh, including Agdere (a key road to Kelbajar), Yerevan was actively devising plans to retake these territories. Armenian strategists assumed Azerbaijan had not yet fortified its reclaimed regions and believed Azerbaijan’s logistical challenges in Kelbajar made such plans feasible.
However, after a series of border skirmishes resulted in defeats for Armenia, these plans were shelved. Armenia also came to realize that Azerbaijan was rapidly building infrastructure in the liberated areas, including roads that bypassed former chokepoints. More significantly, after Azerbaijan’s 2023 anti-terror operations, Baku gained control over the main road through Agdere to Kelbajar. Consequently, the sharp decline in border incidents has little to do with the European observers.
There’s also the matter of EUMA’s controversial actions, including an incident involving fabricated video footage allegedly showing Azerbaijani forces firing at EU monitors. Moreover, during a February 2023 border skirmish in the Zangilan area, where shots were fired from Armenian territory at Azerbaijani border guards, EUMA remained silent. Weeks later, they vaguely claimed they lacked access to the area and could not comment.
Azerbaijan has substantial evidence that EUMA engages in reconnaissance activities, monitors Azerbaijani positions, and shares intelligence with at least French authorities. There is also documented footage of EUMA officials directly overseeing fortification work on the Armenian side of the border.
Even under these circumstances, Baku might have refrained from summoning Poland’s diplomatic representative to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry. The tipping point, however, was Duda’s decision to visit EUMA near the Azerbaijani village of Karki, which remains under Armenian occupation. For Azerbaijan, territorial integrity and border issues are a “red line” — hence the government’s firm response.
This situation raises critical questions: Was this a deliberate message from Warsaw to signal support for Yerevan’s control over Karki? Or was it a protocol oversight, where Duda’s entourage failed to grasp the implications of the location?
A similar pattern has been observed with other foreign visitors to Armenia, including experts, journalists, and political analysts. They are often invited to participate in events and then taken on “excursions” to occupied territories. While one might excuse an uninformed entertainer, like a pop singer, for being unaware of the implications, such an oversight from the President of Poland is unacceptable. Presidents are expected to rely on their protocol teams, embassies, and intelligence services to avoid such blunders.
This incident leaves Azerbaijani audiences awaiting an explanation from Warsaw: Was this an unforgivable protocol error or a calculated provocation? Silence is not golden in this instance, and as of two days ago, Azerbaijan had yet to receive a response to its inquiry.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
