Although no “breakthrough” agreements were announced, the visit to Baku by not only the Russian president but practically the entire cabinet, along with the “protocol details”—from the informal dinner at Ilham Aliyev’s residence to the visit to White City—demonstrated the warm and friendly relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, based on the personal friendship between the two presidents. Without a doubt, this was successfully conveyed. Azerbaijan is one of the few post-Soviet states that has managed to establish normal relations with Russia without compromising its state sovereignty or becoming a satellite state.
And finally, the most important point: In recent years, thanks to Ilham Aliyev’s masterful diplomacy, Azerbaijan’s influence and political weight have grown to the extent that today no issue in the South Caucasus can be resolved without our country and without considering our interests. Azerbaijan is a key partner for the European Union, the United States, Russia, Central Asian countries, and China. Azerbaijan is not a country whose interests can be ignored.
Experts also paid close attention to the agenda of the Putin-Aliyev talks—first in a narrow format, then in a broader one. The discussions covered post-conflict resolution, the North-South transport corridor, humanitarian projects, environmental issues, and much more.
It was perhaps to be expected that the Russian president’s visit to Azerbaijan would be closely monitored in Armenia, where it suddenly became apparent that Moscow does not only see them on the political map of the South Caucasus.
In a situation where Vladimir Putin reminds everyone of Russia’s historical involvement in the region and expresses readiness to facilitate the resolution of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, this is perceived in Yerevan as a warning signal. Armenia’s “agency” is practically at zero. Having chosen the role of a “stronghold” and a tool of another’s policy, Armenia suddenly finds itself in the position of a bargaining chip. This was undoubtedly expected, but in Yerevan, as always, they forgot to think about reality.
And now, the Telegram channel “Armenian Vendetta” does not even try to hide its panic: “Once again, it is terrifying to realize how much Aliyev outplays Pashinyan in terms of diplomacy.” In Yerevan, they are convinced:
Analyzing the situation in the “Armenian-Azerbaijani issue,” the channel’s experts bitterly note: “Pashinyan has achieved a unique feat. He not only made Armenia irrelevant, but he also made it so that Armenia is completely absent from such negotiations. Yes, everything is being discussed without Armenia because Aliyev does not attend Western platforms, and discussions on the Russian platform happen simply without Pashinyan’s presence. Consequently, any agreements reached between Putin and Aliyev will benefit Baku and harm official Yerevan due to its blatantly unconstructive position.”
Another Yerevan-based publication, Yerevan Today, republishes a comment from the Telegram channel “Comrade General”: in its opinion, “absolutely everything discussed in Baku yesterday (August 19th) could have happened in Yerevan. From the transportation of Russian gas to the terms of border delimitation, from the laying of the North-South corridor to the joint celebration of the 80th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War—this all could have been Armenia’s asset, not Azerbaijan’s.” It’s curious to ask how, in the absence of the necessary infrastructure, the North-South corridor could have been laid through Armenia and how Russian gas could have been transported. It is also unclear how the 80th anniversary of Victory would be celebrated in Yerevan, where a monument to the Nazi collaborator Garegin Nzhdeh stands. But there is no doubt that Armenia’s position in Russia is rapidly declining. However, Yerevan’s real dependence on Moscow has not disappeared.
It is hardly a coincidence that Putin’s visit to Baku coincided with a series of “veiled warnings” directed at Yerevan. In Moscow, they not only reminded everyone that all obligations to Armenia within the EAEU and CSTO remain in force, but they also announced that about half of the Armenian brandy on Russian markets is counterfeit. Whether there will be any export “barriers” for Armenian wine products remains to be seen, but Moscow is making it clear that if Yerevan doesn’t reconsider and stop its “hugs” with the West, Moscow will move from the “carrot” to the “stick,” primarily an economic one. Resisting Russian pressure will be very difficult, and Western friends are unlikely to come to the rescue. And if they do, they are unlikely to take on the maintenance of Armenian infrastructure and a budget increase of $1 million solely through domestic oil and gas prices.
So, following Vladimir Putin’s visit to Baku, Yerevan’s experts indeed had reasons to be alarmed.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
