Let’s start with the core of the issue.
From the outset, Azerbaijan refrained from internationalizing the investigation process. Baku declined the involvement of both the United States and the European Union, and simultaneously rejected the CIS Executive Committee’s mediation. Instead, it opted to keep the matter within a narrower framework involving Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, and ICAO. This approach should have been duly appreciated by the Kremlin.
Under ICAO rules, a final report must be published within one year. If the involved parties fail to reach an agreement by then, legal proceedings may follow—a step Baku is now openly preparing for. By doing so, it is signaling to Moscow that there is still time for a diplomatic resolution.
The downed aircraft and Russia’s inadequate response to Azerbaijan lie at the heart of the crisis. All other issues are secondary, mere consequences of this fundamental problem.
President Aliyev’s extensive remarks on the airplane incident—delivered in response to a question about the bilateral crisis—highlight the centrality of this issue in Baku’s position.
Only three months before the tragedy, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid a state visit to Azerbaijan. That visit came at considerable cost for Baku. Numerous Western politicians and analysts harshly criticized Azerbaijan for hosting Putin, and many Western leaders ultimately refused to attend COP29, precisely because of his visit. Moscow is fully aware of this. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan and President Aliyev took a principled stance, hosting the visit at the highest official level.
Yet Russia’s silence since the start of the year has left Baku with the impression that the Kremlin believes: “It happened, and that’s that.”
Baku’s closure of the Russian cultural center “Rossotrudnichestvo” in February was an attempt to break through to the Kremlin—but in vain.
While Moscow has made various gestures and sent signals of goodwill, none have addressed the actual issue of the aircraft incident. The gestures were simply misaligned.
In April, a representative of President Aliyev held negotiations in Moscow. The Kremlin is well aware of Azerbaijan’s expectations. But nothing came of it.
In response, President Aliyev chose not to attend the May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow—though Azerbaijan’s special forces did participate, as a calibrated signal.
By now, President Aliyev has assumed full ownership of the crisis in bilateral relations, articulating Azerbaijan’s expectations with clarity and taking deliberate steps.
Meanwhile, personal attacks on the President of Azerbaijan have begun to surface in Russian media outlets, and Baku is fully aware which Kremlin departments and which curators—such as Mr. Gromov’s media team—are behind these narratives. Azerbaijan’s media response, including critical coverage mentioning the Russian president, is a direct reaction. The same logic applies when Iranian officials cross certain lines and Azerbaijani media respond with coverage referencing the Supreme Leader.
Then came the incident in Yekaterinburg, followed by a series of events that began to metastasize across all dimensions of the bilateral relationship.
In addition to the deteriorating bilateral dynamic, the CIS context has also shifted: Azerbaijan refused to participate in the CIS Economic Council, and it seems Baku has no intention of resuming its activity in this format—again, due to the aircraft incident.
The Kremlin’s indirect messages, relayed via the Russian Minister for Emergency Situations, have gone unanswered—because they fail to address the core issue. Only genuine steps by Russia—such as holding those responsible accountable, offering compensation, and issuing formal apologies—could pave the way toward normalization.
Without that, future flare-ups will be inevitable. There are influential groups within Russia’s security structures harboring resentment toward Azerbaijan, and provocations appear to face no opposition from the Kremlin—effectively receiving tacit approval. In response, Baku acts accordingly.
The current trajectory is one of escalation. Yet the path of de-escalation remains open. The Kremlin knows what is required to pursue that course. For its part, Baku is prepared for both outcomes—though it traditionally favors constructive engagement, grounded in a principled stance.
By Farhad Mammadov, originally published on his Telegram channel @mneniyefm
