Relations between Azerbaijan and Russia are undergoing yet another “test of resilience.” Azerbaijani Milli Majlis (Parliament) deputy Azer Badamov was detained and deported at one of Moscow’s airports. According to Russian authorities, the Azerbaijani parliamentarian is banned from entering the country.
One can come up with a range of more or less plausible explanations as to why Azer Badamov displeased the Russian authorities. But most likely, this was a reaction to the Azerbaijani MP’s principled stance following insulting remarks about Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people made by Russian State Duma deputy Nikolai Valuyev. As both Baku and Moscow clearly remember, unlike Valuyev, Badamov never made any inappropriate or offensive statements.
De jure, a country has the right to deny entry to any foreigner without giving a reason. But in practice, there are nuances. Azer Badamov was part of an official delegation heading to Astrakhan at the invitation of Denis Afanasyev, Deputy Governor and Chairman of the Government of the Astrakhan Region of the Russian Federation, to participate in events marking the 102nd anniversary of the birth of the national leader of the Azerbaijani people, Heydar Aliyev. In such cases, the composition of delegations is discussed in advance through confidential channels. If there are objections to any of the intended visitors, they are simply not included in the delegation. This is a normal and widely accepted practice. But if a person — a member of parliament — is first included in an official delegation and then turned away directly at the airport, how should that be interpreted? Is it just another case of incompetence, or a deliberate attempt to humiliate not just a particular MP, but an entire country?
If this had happened in a newly independent state where civil servants genuinely might not know how to handle such situations, it might be written off as a mistake. But Russia? Has the country run out of professional diplomats? Or did it consider even basic diplomatic courtesy toward Azerbaijan unnecessary?
Azerbaijan clearly remembers how fitness blogger Kamil Zeynalli was detained due to a ridiculous request from Armenia. Back then, timely intervention by Azerbaijani diplomats helped defuse the situation. But questions still remained — especially against the backdrop of Armenian war criminals who continued roaming freely across Russian territory, despite legitimate international arrest warrants issued by Azerbaijan, some of whom are still at large.
There’s also still no proper explanation for the Russian law enforcement raids on Azerbaijani weddings — first claiming to look for draft dodgers, then for a “trash blogger”…
At the same time, Russian authorities have been applying “selective pressure” on citizens of Central Asian states. A raid on a public bathhouse where Kyrgyz citizens had gathered is still remembered not just in Bishkek. And more recently, Russia’s ambassador to Uzbekistan had to respond to complaints about pressure on migrants. Tensions between Russia and Kazakhstan are also rising. What’s happening to Azerbaijani citizens and ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia fits squarely within this trend. In fact, we would add: certain circles in Moscow have long seen pressure on the Azerbaijani diaspora as a convenient way to apply political pressure on the Azerbaijani state — to force official Baku into “obedience.” Moscow has applied this tactic with remarkable persistence since the 1990s, but it has never yielded the intended results. Meanwhile, Armenian citizens enjoy an almost “untouchable” status in Russia. Russian authorities, who so eagerly hunt “illegals” from other republics, leave Armenian nationals alone. Moscow law enforcement also shows no interest in the “underground armed groups” formed by the Armenian diaspora. There was no reaction even to the openly criminal act of trying to recruit mercenaries for the Karabakh war — an initiative of Armenian diaspora organizations. And how should that be interpreted?
Finally, a few behind-the-scenes details. Azerbaijani-Russian relations are already going through a complicated phase. On the one hand, in the final days of 2024, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev gave an interview to a Russian TV channel. Around the same time, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Kirill, visited our country and awarded the Order of Saint Equal-to-the-Apostles Princess Olga to Azerbaijan’s First Vice President and First Lady, Mehriban Aliyeva.
But on December 25, 2024, the Russian air defense system shot down an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft that was approaching Grozny airport. It was shot down by mistake. But instead of taking responsibility, offering an apology, paying compensation, and punishing those responsible, the Russian side began circulating absurd explanations for the crash — ranging from “the plane hit birds” and “pilot error” to “a gas cylinder exploded on board” or even “a joint operation by Ukrainian intelligence and NATO.” What followed was a torrent of inappropriate and offensive statements about Azerbaijan from Russian journalists and lawmakers — with no apologies or consequences. If anyone in Moscow believes that Baku has turned the page on this and forgotten the deaths of its citizens, including the plane’s crew, they are mistaken — Baku has forgotten nothing. Nor has it forgotten the weapons flights from Russia to Armenia disguised as humanitarian aid, or the launch of an Iskander-M ballistic missile on Shusha…
Recently, more details have emerged about Russian cyberattacks on Azerbaijan. While no official Russian body has taken responsibility, the digital footprints exist — and Baku knows exactly where they lead. And once again, we must issue a warning: anyone who still thinks Azerbaijanis are only capable of selling herbs and not skilled in IT — that is far from the truth.
Against this backdrop, the incident with Azerbaijani MP Azer Badamov takes on a whole new meaning. Yes, Baku is interested in maintaining good neighborly relations with Russia. Yes, our countries signed a Declaration on Allied Interaction in Moscow in February 2022. But how do the Russian authorities’ recent actions align with the spirit and letter of that declaration? How does Moscow even envision its role in the development of Azerbaijani-Russian relations, which are — and must remain — a two-way street? And ultimately, what is Moscow trying to achieve — does it truly want a friendly relationship with Azerbaijan, or is it aiming to “discipline” and extract obedience using clearly inappropriate methods?
In any case, the choice now lies with Russia. And these latest actions require, at the very least, an explanation.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
