From the early ‘mistress syndrome’ to the ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ era, the trajectory of their relationship has significantly influenced the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean.
The first phase of Israel-Turkey relations, often described as the ‘mistress syndrome,’ was a time of aspiration for Israel to carve a unique role in the non-Arab Middle East. This era gave birth to the enigmatic Phantom Pact, fostering diplomatic ties between Israel, Iran, and Turkey. It was a period characterized by subtle alliances and shared interests, as both nations sought strategic partners outside the Arab world.
The late 1970s saw Israeli-Turkish relations wane. Turkey’s domestic issues took center stage, prompting Ankara to realign itself with the anti-Israel stance of Arab nations. This shift was motivated, in part, by energy needs and a growing sense of solidarity with the Arab world.
The 1990s marked a resurgence in Israeli-Turkish relations, dubbed the ‘romantic period.’ With Turkey’s internal stabilization and key Middle Eastern peace accords, ties were rekindled. The Middle East Peace Process, improving Turkish-U.S. relations, and the shared concern over Iran and Syria as perceived threats, especially in their support for the PKK, were central in this phase. It was also a counterbalance against the rising influence of Turkey’s Islamist Welfare Party. The military establishment in Turkey viewed Israel as a democratic and secular ally in the Middle East.
The early 2000s witnessed the ‘Neo-Ottomanism’ or ‘post-Kemalist’ phase, marking a decline in relations. This was primarily influenced by the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel. While bilateral trade remained robust, the ideological and policy differences were increasingly evident.
Turkey’s Shifting Foreign Policy
The critical shift in the Israel-Turkey relationship, driven by the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist policies. Erdogan’s administration, which began in 2002 with the AKP, marked a turning point in the once-strong alliance between the two nations.
During this period, Turkish-Israeli relations experienced a decline as a more pronounced pro-Palestinian sentiment emerged in Turkey. Erdogan’s criticisms of Israeli actions became increasingly sharp, despite the continuation of military agreements. In 2005, Erdogan’s visit to Israel aimed at fostering peace and strengthening trade and military ties; however, it was against the backdrop of a shifting Turkish foreign policy.
The most significant consequence of this policy shift was the strained relationship between Turkey and Israel. Turkey’s more welcoming attitude toward Hamas after their 2006 election victory, along with growing relations with Iran and Syria, indicated a substantial realignment in Turkey’s foreign policy.
Erdogan’s tenure marked a substantial departure from the historical ties between the two nations, and the repercussions of this shift in the Eastern Mediterranean are felt to this day. It has not only impacted the Israel-Turkey relationship but has also had far-reaching consequences for regional alliances, with a particular focus on the Eastern Mediterranean’s evolving dynamics.
Challenges and Opportunities for Regional Players
One significant consequence of the deteriorating Israel-Turkey relationship was the opportunity it presented to Greece. Greece, historically at odds with Turkey, capitalized on this diplomatic vacuum. Between 2009 and 2012, Greece and Israel bolstered their cooperation in various domains, including military, economic, and cultural ties.
A driving force behind this renewed partnership was the declining relations between Turkey and Israel. Both Greece and Israel aimed to maintain a balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, leading to the formation of a strategic partnership between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea (EMS).
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and Geopolitical Implications
The EMS emerged as a focal point of geopolitical and energy-related tensions, primarily concerning the EEZ. Although Israel and Turkey did not engage in direct confrontation, Israel’s alignment with Greece and RoC in this dispute placed them on the opposite side of the geopolitical rivalry.
In the 2000s, Mediterranean states signed bilateral EEZ delimitation agreements, primarily for hydrocarbon exploration. The RoC took the lead in this endeavor, resulting in a series of agreements that garnered Turkey’s discontent, given its influence. The RoC’s licensing of international energy giants for hydrocarbon exploration, coupled with significant offshore gas discoveries, recalibrated the strategic balance in the region.
The Thorny Path Ahead
Turkey’s concerns over potential losses of economic interests and security challenges have hindered normalization in Israeli-Turkish relations. Changes in the EMS boundaries could significantly impact Turkey’s standing in the region, particularly in the Aegean Sea and the Gulf of Antalya.
In conclusion, the intricate history of Israel-Turkey relations serves as a testament to the ever-evolving nature of international diplomacy. It has not only shaped the course of events in the Middle East but also influenced the relationships of other regional players, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. As the Eastern Mediterranean remains a geopolitical hotspot, the path ahead is filled with complex challenges and opportunities, and the fate of Israel-Turkey relations will continue to reverberate throughout the region.
Azerbaijan: a pivot state
Azerbaijan pursued a unique strategy distinct from countries like Georgia and Ukraine, which leaned more towards the West. Instead, Azerbaijan sought to strengthen its relations with regional powers such as Turkey to counterbalance Russian influence and with Israel to counter Iran’s influence.
This strategy enabled Azerbaijan to cultivate strong diplomatic, economic, security, and military connections with both Turkey and Israel. Notably, despite the strained relations between Israel and Turkey in recent years, Azerbaijan has adeptly maintained friendly ties with both nations. During this period, neither Israel nor Turkey exerted pressure on Azerbaijan to choose one over the other. This neutrality can be attributed to Azerbaijan’s role as a “pivot state” for both countries, a concept introduced by Mackinder in 1904 in his influential work, “The Geographical Pivot of History.” Mackinder’s theory posited that due to their strategic positions, certain states become pivotal and attract the attention of other nations. These pivot states possess valuable military, economic, or ideational assets desired by great powers, allowing them to engage with multiple major nations simultaneously. Any shifts in their alliances can have significant security implications.
For both Israel and Turkey, Azerbaijan’s abundant energy resources hold immense importance. In 2023, Azerbaijan is expected to export 10.2 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey, up from 8.4 billion cubic meters in the previous year. Additionally, in the first half of 2023, Azerbaijan exported electricity worth $227 million to Turkey, equivalent to approximately 2.8 billion kilowatt-hours. While the precise volume of oil exports from Azerbaijan to Turkey is unspecified, it was noted that around 800,000 barrels per day were exported from Azerbaijan in the first half of 2023, with 76% of this oil flowing through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline into Turkey.
Azerbaijan currently fulfills 40% of Israel’s energy needs, and in the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, various Israeli authorities are actively pursuing increased oil and gas imports from Azerbaijan. This objective was a key topic during a recent visit to Azerbaijan by Israeli Finance Minister Avigdor Lieberman.
Both Israel and Turkey view Azerbaijan as a reliable trade partner, with the confidence that Azerbaijan will not exploit its energy advantages against them. Furthermore, Azerbaijan’s oil and gas transit through Turkey underscores Turkey’s role as a crucial energy hub. Consequently, Turkey places great importance on maintaining strong ties with Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan also acts as a bridge for Turkey to connect with the Turkic world, establishing links with Central Asian Turkic nations. Historically, Azerbaijan maintained its ties with Central Asia during the Soviet era, as both regions were part of the Soviet Union. This unique positioning grants Azerbaijan a deeper understanding of the internal dynamics and elite mindsets in these countries. Without Azerbaijan’s bridging role, Turkey’s engagement with Central Asian nations would be considerably more challenging. Notably, Azerbaijan’s geographical location also positions it as a natural conduit to Central Asia.
Can Azerbaijan mediate Turkish-Israeli relations
In concluding our analysis, Azerbaijan, having effectively addressed its primary security concerns, possesses the capacity to pursue secondary objectives, including facilitating reconciliation between Turkey and Israel. This is feasible despite Azerbaijan’s existing close ties with both nations, despite their strained relationship. Azerbaijan’s role as a crucial intermediary for both Turkey and Israel allows it to maintain a position of neutrality.
Both countries have expressed their approval of Azerbaijan’s mediation efforts. However, certain structural and individual factors within Turkey pose the primary hurdles. Turkey’s commitment to supporting the Palestinian cause is rooted in the Islamic background of the ruling party, the AKP, and President Erdogan. It is improbable that Azerbaijan can alter this political dynamic in Turkey. A considerable segment of the Turkish public also supports the Palestinian cause, which reinforces the significance of these individual-level factors as major impediments.
In addition, structural issues, such as disputes over the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea (EMS), present another barrier. Although Turkey and Israel are not in direct opposition to each other and, as previously discussed, a mutually beneficial EEZ agreement between them is conceivable, it remains a complex challenge to resolve. Azerbaijan could potentially utilize its relations with both nations to mediate this matter. Nonetheless, persuading Israel to annul its EEZ agreement with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece is far from straightforward. To achieve this, it is imperative to establish mutual trust between Turkey and Israel, and this lack of trust largely emanates from the Palestinian issue. The more Turkey isolates itself in the EMS, the more it distances itself from the Palestinian cause.
Nonetheless, recent conflicts between Israel and Palestine have seemingly disrupted the process of normalization between Turkey and Israel. President Erdogan’s recent speech, where he criticized Israel, expressed support for Hamas, refrained from labeling Hamas as a terrorist organization, and referred to Hamas fighters as defenders of their homes, has likely derailed any prospects for normalization. Erdogan’s announcement that he will cancel his planned visit to Israel further indicates that the normalization of Israeli-Turkish relations is currently not on the table. Despite Azerbaijan’s favorable position as a mediator, it appears unable to mend the existing rift between Turkey and Israel.
