Karabakh remains Armenia’s dominant domestic political issue — a fact reaffirmed by the government’s recent publication of long-concealed negotiation documents on the conflict. By releasing these materials, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is attempting to solve internal political problems: he wants to show that all chances to reach an advantageous settlement with Azerbaijan were squandered by his predecessors, and that the war was essentially inevitable under the former authorities.
It is worth recalling that on the eve of the 44-day war, Pashinyan had already threatened to make the details of negotiations public, hinting that this would “explode” Azerbaijan’s domestic situation. Armenia tried more than once — both before and during the war — to destabilize the political environment in Azerbaijan, but at the time those documents were never released. Pashinyan has done so now, when the documents have lost all political and diplomatic relevance, hoping to inflict an informational blow on former presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan — his strongest political rivals.
Whether Pashinyan has succeeded is still an open question. Opposition figures immediately reminded him of his own missteps. Telegram blogger Andranik Hovhannisyan notes: “In August 2019, Pashinyan goes to ‘Stepanakert,’ where he holds a mass rally and chants: ‘Artsakh is Armenia. Full stop.’ Aliyev uses this to halt the negotiation process, accusing Armenia of destructive steps. In July 2020, clashes occur on the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. Pashinyan triumphantly celebrates the participants, escalating tensions. In August 2020, Pashinyan and former Armenian president Armen Sargsyan attend a conference marking the 100th anniversary of the Treaty of Sèvres — effectively an open provocation against Türkiye. Why was this done?”
We may add: the border clashes of July 2020 were also provoked by Armenia in an attempt to threaten Azerbaijan’s strategic oil and railway infrastructure. Today — after Armenia’s defeat in the 44-day Patriotic War, after the 2023 counter-terror operations, and after losing several border skirmishes — Pashinyan now adheres to a peace agenda. But attempts to shift responsibility onto previous governments are not proving very effective.
There is also a broader truth. Before its military defeat, Armenia had no intention of signing anything — let alone withdrawing its forces. Yerevan believed that, sooner or later, Azerbaijan would accept territorial losses, recognize the “line of contact” as a new border, and that everything would remain as it was. And if Azerbaijan resisted, Armenia would simply seize more land. Plans for a new war and new territorial gains existed in Yerevan under both Sargsyan and Pashinyan.
In theory, the international community was supposed to intervene — especially given that four UN Security Council resolutions had been adopted back in the early 1990s, and internationally recognized borders remained unchanged. But…
Coincidence or not, the documents were published almost immediately after the OSCE Minsk Group formally ceased to exist. As has been noted repeatedly, the documents no longer carry any legal or diplomatic weight. More importantly, the publication once again highlighted the utter inadequacy of the mediators. The Minsk Group proposals, the “Lavrov plan,” and other drafts essentially amounted to Azerbaijan’s capitulation: Armenia would nominally withdraw from only five districts surrounding the former NKAO, while retaining Nagorno-Karabakh itself as well as the Lachin and Kalbajar districts. Armenian forces would remain in Karabakh, the separatist regime would preserve its armed units and enjoy the right to maintain external contacts.
All this was already known long before the Armenian government released the papers — through interviews by former co-chairs and Russian officials. These proposals, let us recall, were offered even after the four-day clashes in April 2016, when it became clear that, first, the balance of power formed in the early 1990s no longer reflected reality, and second, the conflict now had a military solution: Azerbaijan could liberate its territory by force, which is exactly what happened four years later.
Moreover, the publication confirms just how “indispensable” the Minsk Group considered itself. Judging by past practice, even after the 44-day war, it would likely have proposed yet another plan filled with concessions to the Armenian side. After the 2020 defeat, Armenia suddenly rediscovered its affection for earlier settlement drafts and began speaking of the need to return to the “Kazan document” and similar proposals.
Now, the mediators can only say “thank you” to Nikol Vovaevich for such a candid display of the negotiation laundry.
Nurani
