On March 9, 2025, The Jerusalem Post published an article titled “Azerbaijan’s SOCAR Set to Sign Israel Gas Exploration Agreement,” written by Dean Shmuel Elmas. The article details SOCAR’s increasing involvement in Israel’s energy industry, with a particular focus on its role in a consortium with British Petroleum (BP) and Yitzhak Tshuva’s NewMed Energy. The consortium is preparing to sign a work plan with Israel’s Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure to explore for gas in Block I, located in Israel’s economic waters.
One of the key figures behind SOCAR’s expansion in Israel is NewMed Energy CEO Yossi Abu, whose efforts will culminate in the upcoming signing ceremony. The event will be attended by a senior Azerbaijani government official, further underlining the strategic importance of this partnership.
This development follows a major deal earlier in 2025, in which Israeli businessman Aaron Frenkel agreed to sell half of his 10% stake in the Tamar gas field to SOCAR. This marks SOCAR’s first drilling operation outside Azerbaijan and is considered a strategic move by Baku. While initially planned for an earlier implementation, the project was delayed due to regional instability and security concerns caused by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.
According to the 2023 tender terms, the consortium must submit a plan by October 2026, which includes at least one drilling operation and an additional work plan approved by Israel’s Petroleum Commissioner. Upon meeting these conditions, the companies will be eligible to extend their operations for an additional two years.
SOCAR’s progress in Israel’s gas exploration carries significant geopolitical weight. As a major energy supplier for both Turkey and Israel, SOCAR holds a strong position in the regional energy market. Over the past 17 years, SOCAR has invested $18.5 billion in Turkey, making it the largest foreign investor in the country, with over 10,000 employees in its Turkish subsidiary.
Azerbaijan is also a critical energy supplier to Israel. In 2024, Azerbaijani oil exports generated $14.4 billion in revenue, with Israel ranking as the country’s sixth-largest market. Despite Turkey’s trade embargo on Israel, the Erdoğan administration has chosen not to obstruct the transport of Azerbaijani oil through its territory to Haifa. This decision reflects Ankara’s energy dependence on SOCAR and its need to maintain stable relations with Azerbaijan.
The article also highlights the close relationship between Azerbaijan and Israel, particularly in defense cooperation. Between 2018 and 2022, Azerbaijan was the second-largest customer of Israeli defense industries, accounting for over 9% of Israeli defense exports. This partnership is also driven by shared concerns over Iran, which Azerbaijan sees as a major regional threat.
While Azerbaijan and Iran maintain official diplomatic relations, tensions persist. Iran has been accused of attempting to interfere in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs, including a recent foiled attempt to harm a leader of Azerbaijan’s Jewish community. In January 2023, the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran was attacked, further straining relations. Tehran also claims that Israel’s Mossad operates within Azerbaijani territory, a claim that Baku has repeatedly denied.
Amid these tensions, Azerbaijani presidential aide Hikmet Hajiyev met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tel Aviv last month to discuss regional developments. Shortly after, an Azerbaijani presidential associate traveled to Ankara to meet with Turkish Communications Director Fahrettin Altun, a close ally of President Erdoğan. The discussions reportedly covered regional and global issues, including Azerbaijan’s growing energy cooperation with Israel.
The agreement between Azerbaijan and Israel’s Ministry of Energy has broader geopolitical implications. Block I, where SOCAR will operate, is located near Israel’s maritime borders with Lebanon and Cyprus. Turkey, however, does not recognize internationally established economic boundaries in this region, as it is the only country that acknowledges the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC). Despite this, Ankara is unlikely to oppose SOCAR’s expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean, given its strong energy ties with Azerbaijan.
Another key motivation for SOCAR’s participation in the Block I exploration project is its strategic location for Azerbaijan’s energy exports. Baku aims to transport gas from Israel to Mersin in southeastern Turkey and subsequently to European markets via existing pipelines in Turkey. This would further strengthen Azerbaijan’s influence in regional energy markets.
Additionally, Azerbaijan may have broader regional energy plans, including expanding pipeline connections across multiple countries. In 2024, approximately 34% of gas produced from Israel’s Tamar reservoir was sold to Jordan, while 81.4% of gas from the Leviathan field was exported. The Fajr gas pipeline, which runs from Jordan to Syria and Lebanon, presents an opportunity for Azerbaijan to participate in a multi-state energy project. Industry experts suggest that such a project could cost up to $200 million—an investment that could provide significant benefits for all involved parties.
SOCAR’s expansion into Israel’s energy sector marks a new phase in Azerbaijan’s international energy strategy. By increasing its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, Azerbaijan strengthens its economic ties with Israel and Turkey while bolstering its geopolitical influence in the region. This move also aligns with broader efforts to enhance cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and other regional players against common threats, including Iran.
As The Jerusalem Post highlights, Azerbaijan’s energy ambitions extend beyond mere commercial interests; they are deeply intertwined with geopolitical calculations. With increasing investments, strategic partnerships, and growing regional influence, Baku is positioning itself as a central player in the evolving energy landscape of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
