Divergent Strategic Engagement Models
Historically, China and India have followed very different paths. China was never a full-fledged colony of European powers. Despite unequal treaties and the existence of colonial “spheres of influence” on its territory, it retained statehood and self-sufficiency. India, by contrast, was under British colonial rule until 1947. Even during colonial times, Chinese diasporas typically avoided serving colonial interests, focusing instead on entrepreneurship within their own communities. Meanwhile, the British Empire relied heavily on Indians — first to subjugate independent entities on the subcontinent, then to support colonial economies elsewhere.
In today’s globalized world, some transnational structures inclined toward neo-colonialism are increasingly favoring India and the Indian diaspora as a channel for influence. China, in contrast, spreads its influence primarily through economic investment without interfering in domestic affairs or dictating political ideologies — a sharp contrast to India’s growing political alignment strategies. This difference is especially visible in the South Caucasus. India is deepening ties with Armenia, a country that itself is expanding relations with several Western powers, including France, known for its active neo-colonial foreign policy.
At a time when the South Caucasus needs peace and mutually beneficial cooperation, India’s approach complicates regional dynamics. Armenia’s political elites tend to emphasize ideological narratives linked to territorial disputes and show little diplomatic flexibility. Instead of engaging in constructive dialogue with its neighbors, Armenia often leans on external support — a trend that increases the risk of instability. Against this backdrop, India’s choice to align with such a complicated partner in a fragile region raises serious questions.
War in Ukraine as a Trigger
The Russian-Ukrainian war disrupted traditional logistics routes, sparking greater interest in the South Caucasus from both Beijing and New Delhi. China accelerated development of the Middle Corridor, while India promoted its International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) via Iran and the South Caucasus to Europe. While both countries see Azerbaijan as a critical transit and energy hub, only China has formalized strategic partnerships with both Azerbaijan and Georgia, actively advancing Middle Corridor development. India, meanwhile, has effectively slowed the INSTC’s optimal route through Azerbaijan.
China’s engagement in the South Caucasus centers on infrastructure investment — building roads, logistics centers, and ports like Anaklia in Georgia. India, by contrast, invests little in the real economy or infrastructure. Instead, it asserts influence through defense ties and political alliances — including arms sales and military cooperation with Armenia.
Stability vs. Militarization
China’s approach is restrained and pragmatic, focused on trade and infrastructure — particularly in Georgia and Azerbaijan. India has chosen a militarized path, signing arms deals worth hundreds of millions with Armenia and declaring strategic interest in the region.
China has remained neutral in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and seeks balanced relations with all three South Caucasus nations. Notably, Armenia’s metallurgy sector — the backbone of its exports — is increasingly oriented toward China. Unlike India, China avoids acting as a proxy for other geopolitical powers or fueling regional rivalries.
By contrast, Armenia’s trade with India is minimal outside of the military sphere. India’s support — focused on weapons and intelligence technologies — contributes to regional imbalances, undermining the Baku–Tbilisi–Yerevan triangle. India also amplifies French geopolitical interests by arming Armenia, effectively acting on France’s behalf in its alliance with Yerevan.
China’s Investments: A Path to Growth
China’s main focus in the South Caucasus is on infrastructure — transport, energy, telecommunications — building highways in Georgia, deepening Asia-Europe logistics integration, and anchoring the Middle Corridor. Its approach emphasizes long-term stability and mutually beneficial economic ties.
India, meanwhile, limits itself to “project-level lobbying” of a hypothetical North–South corridor route through Iran, Armenia, and Georgia — without contributing real infrastructure. Even as a military “ally,” India offers Armenia little in the way of economic aid or infrastructure support. In fact, China’s involvement in Armenia’s mining and metallurgy sectors is far more significant.
India’s Military Posture: A Challenge to Balance
As tensions rise between India and Pakistan, India’s military expansion into the South Caucasus raises the risk of war — especially considering Armenia’s revanchist sentiment. India is seen as a counterweight to Turkey and Pakistan, dragging the South Caucasus into great power rivalries.
India’s provision of radars, missiles, and drones to Armenia is geared for offensive use. Armenian military delegations frequently visit India, and joint exercises aim to rebuild the Armenian army after its defeat in the Second Karabakh War — with Indian help.
Different Goals, Different Agendas
China views the Caucasus as part of a Eurasian bridge connecting Europe and Asia — a vital component of global economic geography. China wants open borders, stable communication routes, and regional cooperation. It opposes separatism and artificial dividing lines.
India sees the South Caucasus as a geopolitical platform to assert influence amid growing tensions with Pakistan, China, and Turkey. Disruption in the South Caucasus — especially if it hinders the Middle Corridor (and thus China’s interests) — may even be advantageous to India. Destruction of infrastructure doesn’t concern India much, as it hasn’t invested in any. Instead, it pours resources into arming Armenia — effectively preparing for a future war that could destroy infrastructure it never helped build.
The South Caucasus as a Stage for Global Competition
The involvement of non-regional actors in the South Caucasus risks fragmenting the region’s security architecture. Competing interests now include not just neighbors like Russia, Turkey, and Iran, but also the U.S., France, India, and China.
The key question for regional states is whether to assert their sovereignty by balancing great powers or become instruments in their global conflicts. The choice is also between development through trade and logistics — or militarization through instability imports. Azerbaijan and Georgia clearly opt for sovereignty and dynamic economic growth, supported by their role in the Middle Corridor. These two nations are central to any viable international transit project.
By contrast, Armenia’s authorities appear to double down on militarization. There are no significant steps to break out of economic and logistical isolation — for example, they block the Zangezur Corridor, which could integrate Armenia into global transit flows. Instead, Armenia relies heavily on external patrons, having aligned itself with France and India while trying to extract benefits from its legacy alliances with Russia and blocs like the CSTO and EAEU.
In the end, there are two scenarios.
In the positive scenario, China and India choose to cooperate economically in the South Caucasus without fueling conflicts. India may come to see the limits of its militarized approach and begin investing in logistics and infrastructure — particularly in support of the North–South Corridor, which intersects with the Middle Corridor in Azerbaijan, potentially boosting regional growth.
In the negative scenario, the South Caucasus becomes another peripheral theater in global geopolitical confrontation — mirroring the Indo-Pacific rivalry or the India–Pakistan conflict in Kashmir. This would stall economic development and shatter hopes for peaceful coexistence in the region.
Elbrus Mammadov
P.S. Center for Expert Analysis “Great Silk Road”, exclusively for Minval.
