Caliber.Az presents an interview with Russian expert, journalist, and public figure Maxim Shevchenko.
– Maxim Leonardovich, what do you think is the reason for the recent unannounced visit of the US CIA chief Williams Burns to Armenia?
– Mr. Burns knows the post-Soviet region very well, he is fluent in Russian, and he has been US Ambassador in Moscow for a long time. As for the purpose of his visit, I think it was related to the fact that there is a world war going on and some balance of forces is being determined. It is certain that direct consultations are held with the Armenian leadership in order to adjust the positions on strategic issues which are crucial for the Americans.
The principal issue concerning Armenia is its relations with Russia and hardly anyone will be able to influence this. The second issue is Armenia’s relations with Türkiye and Azerbaijan and, of course, Iran. Most likely the Iranian issue was also discussed because Tehran stated that if there is an attempt to block the Iranian-Armenian border, it will take the most decisive actions. In other words, I think Burns’ visit to Yerevan was connected with a whole range of problems, but the Iranian issue remains the key one for the Americans.
– So, we can assume that the visit of the CIA chief to Armenia took place now because the situation in Yerevan is favorable for intelligence work against Iran?
– I must say that this is extremely dangerous for Armenians because for them Iran is the last window to the world. I doubt that they will betray Iran. For Armenia, abandoning normal and profitable relations with Iran is practically unacceptable; it is unlikely that they will go for it in Yerevan.
– However, the visit of Sergey Naryshkin, head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, to Yerevan right after Burns was surely not accidental, but a response of Moscow…
– Naryshkin’s visit to Yerevan was indeed accidental. Meanwhile, he also visited Baku, so it is not ruled out that it was a trip to the region. Understandably, Russia does not want to lose its rather strong position in the region. South Caucasus is very important for Russia’s interests, but it is among unstable regions. Therefore, of course, Naryshkin’s visit was related to this, plus Putin’s visit to Iran, his rather warm meeting with the head of Iran, and the Russian-Iranian statements – all are significant moments.
– Will the meetings of the leaders of Iran, Türkiye, and Russia in Tehran somehow affect the processes in the region?
– In general, I consider the meetings held in Tehran between the leaders of the three countries as a positive fact, but I must say that in the end no specific breakthroughs were announced. For example, it is not quite clear whether or not Russia supports sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program. If Russia in any way supports the anti-Iranian sanctions, then Iranian-Russian relations cannot be called fully allied. We have not heard any statements about this. Perhaps the sides have agreed to withdraw from the sanctions regime, but have not publicized this moment. If this is the case, then we can talk about a breakthrough for Iran. Russia backed Western sanctions against Iran in its time and held back the development of the Iranian nuclear program at the request of the West and Israel. If Moscow were now to withdraw from the sanctions regime against Iran and have an open alliance with it, this would certainly strengthen the anti-Western front, that is, the Russian-Iranian front. In this way, a serious force will already be created, because we are talking about the exchange of weapons and technology. Iran has weapons that Russia does not have, such as unmanned aerial vehicles. Iran has developed them itself, having seized American drones, among other things, and they are quite powerful models. Russia has no drones in its arsenal, but it has missile technology that Iran wants and can get. But here we must keep in mind that, roughly speaking, such a deal is tantamount to a double-edged sword, because it would mean turning Iran into a powerful regional power with imperial ambitions. Given that Tehran does have imperial ambitions, this nuance poses a threat to Azerbaijan. Baku will perceive this fact as a threat. Therefore, everything must be balanced. The statements made at the end of the visit to Tehran were very cautious, and we can only guess what was happening on the sidelines.
– Doesn’t Iran becoming a nuclear power pose a threat to Russia itself?
– Russia is against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as you yourself understand. And it is not going to transfer technology to anyone, at least this follows from the official Russian doctrine, from the statements of Russian officials. Russia will not facilitate the transfer of nuclear military technology to Iran, but a confrontation with the West may require other solutions. Everything here will depend not so much on Russia as on the development of the overall situation. If the conflict with the West intensifies, then of course the search for allies and the creation of new alliances will also follow completely different rules than during peacetime. This is an essential point.
– How significant is the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict between Russia and the West?
– This probability is quite high.
– And finally, let’s talk about Turkish-Russian relations. How do you see them in the future, especially after the recent meeting between Erdogan and Putin in Tehran?
– I think that the Russia-Türkiye-Iran trio, the regional powers, is a very promising alliance. I would fully support the development of Russian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian relations in a friendly way. But this depends on the elections to be held in Türkiye in the near future. Neither Russia nor Iran depend so much on these elections, but Türkiye does. But on the whole, a Russian-Turkish-Iranian alliance would change the entire world configuration. It would be a really powerful alternative to the West. But so far we see only the leaders’ intentions, while inside Türkiye, for example, there is serious opposition to Erdogan. Six years ago he only managed to stay in power because of a failed military coup and people taking to the streets to support him. That’s when the foundation of Russian-Turkish relations was formed, because President Putin immediately came to Erdogan’s aid, while Western countries were clearly waiting for the overthrow of the Turkish leader and made their statements only in the afternoon when it was already clear that the situation was in favor of the country’s legitimate president. And I think this is generally what predetermined the positive development of Russian-Turkish relations, based on the personal contacts between the two presidents.
Matanat Nasibova
Caliber.Az
