Globalinfo.az conducted an interview with Dr. Imran Khalid, a geostrategic analyst and international affairs columnist based in Karachi, Pakistan, regarding current topics in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.
Here is the full interview:
– According to the Telegram channel “VChK-OGPU,” which is close to Russian security services, the visit of Russia’s Minister for Emergency Situations, Aleksandr Kurenkov, to Baku to hold unofficial talks on bilateral relations ended without results. Reportedly, the Azerbaijani side insisted on Russia officially acknowledging the downing of an AZAL aircraft in December, but the Kremlin rejected the demand. Moreover, the Baku court refused to change the pretrial detention of Russian journalists. Mr. Khalid, how do you see this tension being resolved? What opportunities exist for compromise, and what is your outlook for Russia-Azerbaijan relations?
The breakdown in talks between Kurenkov and Baku, along with the continued detention of Russian journalists despite Moscow’s diplomatic efforts, signals a serious confrontation. Azerbaijan’s firm stance highlights its commitment to judicial sovereignty.
Resolving the issue will likely require a comprehensive approach. Despite its regional influence, Russia cannot ignore Azerbaijan’s expanding international partnerships and assertive foreign policy. If Moscow were to show readiness to handle the situation more transparently and respectfully—perhaps by allowing independent investigations or offering compensation over the aircraft incident—a path toward mutual understanding might emerge.
Azerbaijan is unlikely to compromise its national interests. While Russia remains a major regional player, its influence in the South Caucasus has declined—especially after Azerbaijan’s reclaiming of Karabakh between 2020 and 2023—making Baku far less dependent on Moscow than before. Future relations will likely feature a more balanced dynamic: Azerbaijan will diversify its partnerships and assert its sovereignty, while maintaining pragmatic cooperation with Russia where interests align.
– Even if tensions subside, stability between Moscow and Baku remains uncertain. What factors or events could prompt Russia to resume aggressive policies toward Azerbaijan? What aggravates Moscow most?
Moscow’s frustration stems primarily from Azerbaijan’s increasingly independent foreign policy and closer ties with Turkey and the West—forces that challenge Russia’s traditional sphere of influence in the South Caucasus. Key aggravating factors include:
Azerbaijan’s decisive victory in Karabakh in 2023 and the effective sidelining of Russian peacekeepers marked a significant power shift that undermined Russia’s strategic goals.
Strengthening of Azerbaijan’s ties with Turkey, Pakistan, and Western states, including discussions on projects like the Zangezur Corridor involving Western actors, directly opposes Moscow’s desire for regional hegemony.
Expansion of new energy routes and increased Azerbaijani gas exports could threaten Russia’s energy leverage in Europe and Central Asia.
Rising anti-Russian sentiment within Azerbaijan—fueled by incidents like the downing of the AZAL aircraft—combined with the desire to reduce dependency on Russia, complicates Moscow’s influence.
Should Azerbaijan continue deepening partnerships outside of Russia’s comfort zone or directly challenge Moscow’s security interests in the Caspian or Caucasus regions, the Kremlin could adopt more aggressive tactics. These might include economic pressure, cyberattacks, or support for destabilizing internal elements.
– The Carnegie Endowment claims a U.S. company will oversee the Zangezur Corridor. Meanwhile, Armenia’s Hraparak reports that Washington is increasing pressure on Yerevan to sign a peace agreement. How do you assess these developments in the context of Baku-Moscow tensions?
These reports underscore the West’s growing interest in the region. Azerbaijan views the Zangezur Corridor as a vital strategic link to boost regional trade, connectivity, and its own geopolitical significance. While some might question the idea of a U.S. company overseeing the corridor, if it respects Azerbaijani sovereignty and guarantees safe, uninterrupted transit, it could serve as a pragmatic solution to ensure functionality and prevent disruptions—particularly as an alternative to Russian or Iranian influence.
The U.S. pressure on Armenia to sign a peace deal aligns with Azerbaijan’s consistent calls for a rapid and comprehensive agreement. Given Armenia’s deteriorating ties with Russia and possible exit from the CSTO, this pressure could push Yerevan toward necessary compromises for a stable peace that benefits regional development. The U.S. appears poised to act as a key mediator, leveraging economic incentives and security guarantees.
– Protests in Armenia have called for the removal of Russian TV channels from cable networks. Analysts suggest Russia is losing its grip on the region. If Armenia and Azerbaijan sign a peace treaty, Armenia normalizes relations with Turkey, and the Zangezur Corridor opens—what will happen to Russia’s regional policy?
The protest against Russian television, Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO, and growing ties with the West all indicate a significant departure from Moscow’s traditional dominance.
Once a peace treaty is signed and Armenian-Turkish relations normalize—alongside the opening of the Zangezur Corridor—Russia will likely be forced to recalibrate its approach in the Caucasus. It would lose one of its key levers of influence: the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.
Moscow might shift its focus to emerging trade and transit routes connecting Russia with Turkey, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, trying to integrate into or exert influence over these new corridors.
It may also strengthen bilateral ties with countries like Georgia to prevent their full alignment with Western or Turkish interests.
Despite a reduction in military influence, Russia will likely retain its military base in Armenia’s Gyumri as a symbolic strategic foothold, even if it carries little real power. The protest movement in Armenia suggests that Russia will increasingly rely on soft power and information warfare to maintain cultural and political influence.
Turkey is becoming the dominant foreign actor in a region once heavily influenced by Russia. This new reality will compel Moscow to adopt a more reactive and defensive posture—focused less on domination and more on preserving its remaining influence.
– On July 3–4, the ECO Summit was held in Khankendi. Delegations from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and other Turkic-speaking states visited the liberated Karabakh region. What is the significance of this event, in your view?
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) summit in Khankendi on July 3–4, 2025, with participation from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and other Turkic states, holds major significance for Azerbaijan. Hosting such a high-level event in a city recently liberated from occupation carries powerful symbolic weight. It reaffirms Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over these territories and demonstrates their reintegration into the country’s political and economic life.
The summit emphasized enhanced regional cooperation in trade, connectivity, and green transformation. It gave Azerbaijan a platform to showcase Karabakh’s economic potential, attract investment for its reconstruction and development, and position it as a future trade hub.
The summit theme—“A New ECO Vision for a Sustainable and Climate-Resilient Future”—aligns with Azerbaijan’s post-conflict reconstruction efforts and commitment to green initiatives, positioning Baku as a regional leader in sustainable development within the ECO framework.
Participation by Turkey and other Turkic states also reinforced Azerbaijan’s strategic focus on Turkic solidarity and cooperation.
High-level representation of ECO member states in Khankendi signifies international recognition of the new realities in the region and Azerbaijan’s legitimate control over the formerly occupied territories.
Translated from Globalinfo.az
