Following the signing of the Strategic Partnership Charter between Armenia and the United States in Washington, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan shared his vision of the country’s foreign policy trends. He emphasized the groundwork being laid for “strengthening Armenia’s independence and sovereignty,” steps toward which, he claimed, will be taken in subsequent stages of Yerevan’s “balanced foreign policy.”
This statement immediately raises questions. First, what exactly does Pashinyan mean by Yerevan’s “balanced” policy? Could it be an attempt to maintain ties with multiple geopolitical players? On one side, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU); on the other, a new format of relations with the U.S.? It seems so, as Pashinyan described the “policy of balancing” as having “overcome the first threshold” following the U.S. agreement. He did not specify what this “threshold” was but described Armenian-Russian relations as “more pragmatic than ever,” with a clear focus on practicalities rather than “emotional packaging.” Moscow might attempt to decipher this typically ambiguous phrasing.
Meanwhile, Pashinyan expanded on Yerevan’s “super-balanced” foreign policy trends, specifically highlighting relations with Iran. He described these ties as being based on the “natural interests” of both countries, albeit in unprecedented terms. Tehran may now be wondering what Pashinyan meant by “natural interests,” especially given that the U.S.-Armenia charter includes clauses that directly contradict Iran’s interests in the region. Nevertheless, Pashinyan quickly shifted to discussing “a visible basis of understanding” between Yerevan and Ankara.
Here, Turkey may need to analyze what lies behind this “visible basis.” Could the “invisible basis” be the fact that no progress has been made toward opening the border between Turkey and Armenia? Turkey has repeatedly stated that the borders will open only after all issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan are resolved. Pashinyan is undoubtedly aware of this, yet he continues to repeat the same approach, claiming Yerevan has offered “constructive solutions to all existing issues” and that this eliminates the “legitimacy of escalating tensions in the region.”
However, the inclusion of provisions in the U.S.-Armenia charter that could destabilize the South Caucasus seems to contradict Pashinyan’s narrative. Instead of addressing constitutional territorial claims against Azerbaijan, Pashinyan continues down a revanchist path. His statements indicate no urgency to amend Armenia’s constitution, which still reflects such claims.
Pashinyan appears more focused on placing “strengthened friendships with France, strategic partnerships with the U.S., and closer ties with the EU” on one side of the geopolitical scale. This approach undermines his own claims of “balanced” foreign policy, as his remarks fail to resonate as diversification in global affairs.
The Armenian Prime Minister seems undeterred by such contradictions, confidently summarizing that his government’s policies “lay the groundwork for strengthening Armenia’s independence and sovereignty.” Yet this raises another question: has Pashinyan abandoned his 2024 stance that independence means “replacing dependence on a few with dependence on many”? If not, how does he reconcile “strengthening sovereignty” with an increasing reliance on multiple powers? By his logic, the more dependencies Yerevan has, the stronger Armenia’s independence becomes.
Perhaps one day Pashinyan will clarify this paradox. Until then, his narrative continues to weave between “historical” and “real” Armenia, “multi-dependent independence,” and “balanced” foreign policy. For now, we can only wait for the next round of Pashinyan’s “logical illogic” and the pearls of wisdom it might bring.
Teymur Atayev
