Kazakhstan is diversifying its oil export routes. As Minval Politika reported, citing Reuters and its own sources, Kazakhstan will increase oil deliveries through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in December after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) reduced its capacity due to a Ukrainian drone strike. Although CPC exports have resumed, they are operating at lower throughput. Kazakhstan now plans to send around 188,000 tons of crude in December — a 30% increase compared to November — into the Azerbaijani BTC export pipeline. Most of this volume will come from Tengizchevroil and the Kashagan field.
The issue, however, goes beyond the high-profile drone strike. According to Reuters, pipeline infrastructure has become overloaded due to attacks on Russian facilities, limiting opportunities for additional shipments.
To recap: the strike on CPC took place on November 29. Kazakhstan condemned the attack through an official statement by its Foreign Ministry. Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, in turn, emphasized: “We underline that no actions by the Ukrainian side are directed against the Republic of Kazakhstan or any third country — all efforts of Ukraine are focused on repelling Russia’s full-scale aggression.” Kyiv also reminded: “We once again stress that the only source of destabilization and security challenges in the Black Sea region and beyond remains Russian aggression.” Analysts note that the Novorossiysk oil terminals handle not only Kazakh but also Russian crude. And one thing is beyond doubt: the Black Sea is now an active conflict zone.
It is also worth recalling the geography of oil exports. Azerbaijan, from the very beginning, built an independent pipeline system. True, there is an export route to Novorossiysk, but it is currently inactive. Another pipeline goes to the Georgian port of Supsa. But the main artery is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Kazakhstan’s situation is fundamentally different: most of its exports flow through the CPC pipeline, which skirts the Caspian from the north and leads to Novorossiysk — a route controlled by Russia.
Until recently, Astana did not give much thought to this dependency. Relations with Moscow were relatively warm; Kazakhstan was a member of both the CSTO and the Eurasian Economic Union. But the war in Ukraine changed the calculus. Sanctions on Russia began to intensify — including in the sensitive area of exporting its oil and gas. Astana even began discussing the possibility of “replacing” Russia in the global oil market. And suddenly, as if on cue, problems started emerging at the Novorossiysk terminals.
In March 2022 — long before anyone had heard of Ukraine’s naval drones — Moscow claimed that a powerful storm in the Black Sea had damaged the terminals so severely that Kazakh oil shipments had to be drastically reduced. Moreover, Russian authorities said that repairs required imported parts and components that would be difficult to procure under sanctions. And now, after the Ukrainian strike, Russia is prioritizing the transport of its own crude through Novorossiysk — the portion it can still manage to sell — once again at the expense of its export-logistics commitments to Kazakhstan. As a result, Astana is doing exactly what any country would do in such circumstances: searching for alternative export routes. The primary option is Azerbaijan — first via tankers from Aktau to Baku, and then through the pipeline to Ceyhan.
This makes two things very clear. First, Azerbaijan took a wise strategic decision decades ago by building an independent system for exporting oil and gas. Second, this Azerbaijani export infrastructure now reshapes geopolitics far beyond Azerbaijan’s borders. As the saying goes, “air finds a way through even the smallest gap.” Oil and gas do too. The only question is who ultimately pays the price. Judging by recent developments, the Ukrainian drone strike may have dealt a far bigger blow to relations between Astana and Moscow than to ties between Kazakhstan and Kyiv.
Nurani
