One of the most prominent among these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which connects the Indian Ocean to Central Russia and Europe. However, the deteriorating security situation surrounding Iran has significantly increased risks to this corridor, casting doubt on its reliability and resilience.
The most vulnerable points in the project are the transport routes that pass through Iran, the southern port infrastructure, and the Strait of Hormuz — one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints. The ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, both essential for cross-border logistics, are potential targets in the event of Israeli airstrikes. Bandar Abbas serves as the main maritime gateway for Indian cargo, while Chabahar — developed with Indian support as an alternative to Pakistan’s Gwadar — is one of the few logistical hubs not subject to strict U.S. sanctions, allowing both Russia and Iran to use it for trade. However, in the context of military conflict, even formally civilian logistics infrastructure may be reclassified as supporting military supply chains — thus becoming legitimate targets.
Even limited strikes on these ports could seriously disrupt the maritime segment of the INSTC for an extended period. Given Iran’s international isolation and the difficulty of restoring infrastructure under sanctions, the damage could be long-lasting. Yet the gravest threat is the potential blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
For the North–South Corridor, such a scenario would be catastrophic. Indian cargo would no longer be able to reach Iranian ports, potentially collapsing the corridor’s entire southern route. Alternative paths via the Suez Canal would eliminate INSTC’s main competitive advantages — speed and cost-efficiency. Furthermore, even the threat of a blockade would drive up insurance premiums and push shipping companies to abandon the route, undermining trust in the corridor as a stable logistical solution.
These risks are not only economic, but also political. India, a major proponent of the project, may face a dilemma: continue involvement and risk entanglement in regional instability, or reassess its strategic logistics priorities. Russia, which heavily relies on Iran’s southern ports and Caspian infrastructure, would likewise be forced to prepare for possible disruptions.
For Iran, the stakes are especially high — the country channels most of its foreign trade through these two ports. If they cease operations, Iran could face near-total economic isolation.
In this context, all parties involved increasingly recognize that pressing ahead with the project under such sustained geopolitical tension is not only unwise but potentially dangerous. At the very least, this holds true for the current period of heightened military risk, which could persist for an indeterminate time.
This is precisely why Azerbaijan’s foresight becomes evident. While participating in the North–South Corridor, Baku has simultaneously invested in alternative routes. At the GLOBSEC 2025 forum, Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to the President of Azerbaijan, stated that Baku anticipated potential escalation and proactively prepared for challenges posed by neighboring countries under sanctions or embroiled in conflict. He emphasized Azerbaijan’s central position amid a complex geopolitical environment — situated between the Russia–Ukraine war and the growing Israel–Iran confrontation.
This approach reflects Baku’s strategic mindset: minimizing risks and avoiding over-dependence on unstable directions. The focus is now on the development of the Middle Corridor — a route that passes through countries not involved in direct military conflicts and bound by common political goals, particularly through membership in the Organization of Turkic States. As key elements of the North–South Corridor face mounting external threats, the Middle Corridor is increasingly seen as a more stable and politically predictable alternative.
In a time when the fate of Eurasian transport routes is shaped less by economic calculation than by the ability of states to adapt to a volatile world, Azerbaijan demonstrates both flexibility and strategic foresight — positioning itself as a country prepared for any scenario. And in times of uncertainty, such a stance may prove to be the winning one.
This does not mean that the North–South Corridor has lost its strategic relevance for Baku. The Israel–Iran war cannot last forever. Once the conflict ends, or even subsides for a prolonged period, the project could regain momentum.
Even now, the continuation of critical infrastructure projects within the INSTC framework cannot be ruled out — particularly the construction of the Resht–Astara railway line, whose importance is expected to grow significantly in the years ahead.
Ilgar Velizade
