After the aggression against Ukraine, Georgia refused to join Western sanctions against Russia, and while officially supporting Ukraine, it has maintained a restrained tone in its rhetoric and actions. As I wrote earlier, if Ukraine emerges from the war with minimal losses and relations between Tbilisi and Moscow normalize, Russia will inevitably be forced to reconsider its stance on Georgia’s territorial integrity and seek solutions.
Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia is nothing more than a piece of paper, lacking any international legal force. Just as some third-world countries once passed resolutions on the so-called “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,” which remained only on paper.
According to Sergey Shamba, the “foreign minister” of the separatist regime, as of September 1, Russia has stopped social payments to teachers, healthcare workers, and security personnel in Abkhazia. Additionally, energy supplies during the autumn-winter period will be provided at commercial rates. There are suggestions that Russia’s move is aimed at punishing the separatist region with financial sanctions. It is claimed that Abkhazia’s leadership is resisting the integration of its administrative structures, including its judicial system, into the Russian governance framework. So, what has caused this sudden defiance in Abkhazia?
The truth is that as relations between Tbilisi and Moscow normalize, separatists, especially those who once opposed the central government, are experiencing significant anxiety. They fear, particularly after Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh, that Russia might “abandon” Abkhazia just as it “abandoned” the Armenians. These concerns have intensified following Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s statement about the possible reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia into Georgia.
It’s well known that the current Georgian government has repeatedly expressed its readiness to invest $10 billion in Abkhazia and South Ossetia should they return to Georgia (potentially even in a federal arrangement). The idea of uniting Abkhazia and Georgia within a confederal state was discussed before the August 2008 war in negotiations between Tbilisi and Sukhumi with Moscow’s participation. These talks took place after Russia had effectively occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia following the war.
In August 2008, then-Russian President Medvedev proposed uniting South Ossetia and Abkhazia in a confederation, but Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili rejected the proposal. It was clear that the West would not allow Russia to implement this plan. Before Ukraine, the West sought to make Georgia a victim of Russia, which is why it dragged Saakashvili into an ill-prepared war with the separatist regions. However, it quickly became evident that a small country could only last five days in a war with a heavily armed Russia. As a result of this misadventure, Russia abandoned the idea of a confederation and recognized the “independence” of the separatist regions.
Now, separatists in Sukhumi are worried that with shifting “tectonic plates” in Russia’s regional policies, Abkhazia may become part of a “grand plan” between Moscow and Tbilisi. The separatists view Ivanishvili, seen as “Moscow’s man,” as a far greater threat to Abkhazia’s “sovereignty” than Mikheil Saakashvili ever was.
There are no openly pro-Russian forces in Georgia. Russia no longer creates parties or organizations to promote its people in other countries. The policy has shifted: interventions are now more subtle and modernized, without overt invasions. The policies of the current Georgian government suit Russia, and if they suit Russia, they contradict the West’s interests.
Russia’s diplomatic stance on the issue of returning Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Georgia is also noteworthy. For instance, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Galuzin recently stated that the Georgian government had learned its lesson from Saakashvili’s criminal misadventure and now intends to reclaim Abkhazia and South Ossetia through peaceful means. “For our part, we also believe that the prerequisites for normalization in the Sukhumi-Tbilisi-Tskhinvali triangle will emerge once Georgia accepts the existing reality and is ready to build relations with the republics on the basis of equality and mutual respect. In this regard, signing legal guarantees of non-aggression between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and resolving the issue of border delimitation and demarcation are of utmost importance.” Is any further comment needed?
The West has not abandoned its plans to push Georgia toward the same scenario as Ukraine. They will attempt to do this in the upcoming parliamentary elections next month. Currently, the West is directing all its information and propaganda resources against Georgia’s ruling party. Let’s not forget that the West still has levers of influence over protest movements in Georgia. If they succeed, Georgia will once again find itself in a no-win situation.
Georgians often say that no political technologies work on them. The behavior of the average Georgian is unpredictable. So, we too should not rush to conclusions.
Nazim Sabiroglu
Translated from Musavat.com
