These tensions hold significant implications not only for Baku and Moscow, but also for Türkiye, a close ally of Azerbaijan and a country that has long walked a fine line in its relations with Russia, despite being a NATO member.
Ankara’s response to the escalating tension between Baku and Moscow seems to be strategically measured. Türkiye has urged restraint from both sides and expressed its concern over the broader instability in the South Caucasus. However, beneath these calls for calm lie well-calculated foreign policy considerations based on Türkiye’s regional ambitions and relations with both sides. Understanding how Ankara perceives the tensions between Baku and Moscow and what it means for its foreign policy in the region is important.
The tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan have been simmering beneath the surface for some time but have peaked recently. Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war has fueled its ambitions and encouraged President Ilham Aliyev, who has been in power since 2003, to pursue a foreign policy that is less reliant on Moscow.
Three significant events have led Russia to lose its previously held influence on Azerbaijan and the broader South Caucasus: Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh victory, the prolonged war in Ukraine, and its loss of a key ally in Syria. These developments have also shifted the balance of power in the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan positioning itself as a more autonomous actor, Armenia repairing its ties with both Ankara and Baku, and Türkiye filling the vacuum created by the diminishing Russian and Iranian influence.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, returning from a visit to Azerbaijan last week, said to reporters aboard his flight that Türkiye’s “greatest wish” is to ensure these “unfortunate incidents” do not lead to “irreparable damage” in Baku-Moscow relations. His statement reflected Ankara’s cautious approach that aims to maintain its close strategic relationship with both countries.
Türkiye’s relationship with Azerbaijan is often described as “one nation, two states” due to the cultural and political bonds between them. During the 2020 war, Türkiye offered support to Azerbaijan, although only doing so carefully to avoid provoking Russia directly.
On the other hand, Türkiye and Russia, despite having differences on some regional issues, have maintained a balanced relationship. They have found ways to compartmentalize their ties, from energy cooperation to arms purchases, such as Türkiye’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system, despite Western countries’ unease. The compartmentalized nature of their relationship was cemented through the close personal ties between Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin.
Given this personalized and interest-oriented relationship, Türkiye cannot pick a side in this situation. Rather, it can rely on its relationship with both sides to avoid any instability in the South Caucasus that may threaten its regional goals. To maintain the status quo, Türkiye is now pushing for a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On Thursday, Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan met in Abu Dhabi, a meeting that could be considered a turning point for the balances in the South Caucasus.
There are also reports that Türkiye is working on a tentative agreement with Armenia and Azerbaijan on the long-debated Zangezur Corridor, which — if concluded — would mark a watershed moment in the region. Ankara views the corridor as part of a “geoeconomic revolution,” in the words of Erdogan. Unsurprisingly, this corridor is viewed with concern by both Russia and Iran, which fear being sidelined.
Meanwhile, some former Azerbaijani officials have publicly called for the establishment of a Turkish military base in Azerbaijan. While no official confirmation has been forthcoming, such statements signal that Baku is seeking to bolster its military capabilities and infrastructure, most likely with Turkish support. This will certainly annoy Moscow; however, Türkiye is likely to be careful not to appear too assertive.
Unlike Western countries — which seem to view the Baku-Moscow tensions as an opportunity to further isolate Russia and bring Azerbaijan closer to the Western sphere — Türkiye prefers a balancing act that avoids isolating Russia and prevents Azerbaijan from taking bolder steps. This is because Ankara sees there is too much at stake to risk a complete rupture between Baku and Moscow. Unlike the West, Türkiye is more focused on economic integration in the South Caucasus, which is not only part of its neighborhood but also a geopolitical corridor vital to its interests.
I assume Ankara is also well aware that, despite the rhetorical escalation and retaliatory actions, Azerbaijan and Russia are unlikely to completely sever their ties. Their economic and regional interdependence requires maintaining relationships despite mutual suspicion and distrust. Also, what we see is that much of the tension is largely influenced by the personalities of the two leaders.
Certainly, incidents such as last December’s shooting down of an Azerbaijani civilian plane by Russia, which killed 38 people, and tit-for-tat arrests have exposed deep-seated tensions that will not be easily repaired. However, the past shows that severe rifts can be overcome. For example, consider the 2015 incident when Türkiye downed a Russian military jet near the Syrian border. Turkish-Russian bilateral relations hit rock bottom in the wake of the incident, but within a year the two sides had restored ties and even launched the Astana peace process for Syria. A similar trajectory could emerge between Baku and Moscow, with current tensions giving way to a pragmatic detente.
Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Türkiye’s relations with the Middle East.
