The armed conflict between Israel and Iran ended 12 days after it began, according to posts on social media by U.S. President Donald Trump. But what did the world ultimately gain from this conflict? What changed following the Israeli-Iranian military confrontation, which also involved limited U.S. participation? How did this clash affect the South Caucasus region, and what should Azerbaijan expect from Iran going forward?
Farhad Mammadov, head of the South Caucasus Research Center, called the end of the armed conflict between Israel and Iran unusual.
“If this really is the end of the war, then it is unusual, as there is no official peace document between Israel and Iran. The fundamental dynamics in their relationship remain unchanged. Iran still does not recognize Israel as a state, and Israel, in turn, has not succeeded in securing any commitment from Iran to halt its nuclear program—the stated goal of its military actions. In effect, we are witnessing an informal ceasefire with no UN Security Council resolutions. This was yet another war conducted outside the framework of the international system and international law, and it retains full potential to resume in the near future,” Mammadov told 1news.az.
He noted that the Israeli-Iranian confrontation represented a new type of war—between countries that do not share a border, using primarily missile and drone weaponry. Furthermore, the involvement of the United States as a third major actor, and the bombing of U.S. military bases—even if limited—on the territory of other Middle Eastern states, added complexity to the situation.
“The U.S. has largely addressed its strategic concerns about Iran. First, in terms of Iran’s regional policies—by disrupting the so-called ‘axis of resistance.’ Then, by inflicting significant damage to Iran’s nuclear program infrastructure and personnel, in cooperation with Israel. Finally, by limiting Iran’s missile program. While none of these objectives were fully achieved, the damage was considerable. Washington took advantage of this window of opportunity to weaken Iran in all three areas,” he explained.
Regarding President Trump, Mammadov said, “He remains one of the most quoted politicians globally and seeks to show tangible results on the international stage aligned with the initiatives he has pursued since the beginning of his presidency.”
Mammadov emphasized that the military confrontation between Iran and Israel posed a serious threat to the South Caucasus region.
“For our region, this war was certainly a challenge. There were risks of radiation spreading, internal destabilization in Iran, humanitarian fallout, and—though small—a real possibility of some combat activity spilling over into the South Caucasus. For now, under the ceasefire, we can breathe a little easier. But it’s important to understand that Iran will soon have to respond internally to the consequences of this war. We must closely monitor the domestic political developments in that country. Regionally, we now face the reality that another neighbor has been weakened by war. Much will depend on the course Iran’s leadership chooses—whether it will focus on recovery and constructive engagement, or take on the role of a wounded beast acting unpredictably. I believe we will see a mix of constructive steps and aggressive rhetoric. But the damage inflicted on Iran—militarily and psychologically—is significant. The Iranian public has lost the sense of security that the authorities had built for decades. The social contract between the government and the people has been broken, and we’ll see how Iranians evaluate the situation their country now finds itself in.”
According to Mammadov, the nature of Azerbaijan-Iran relations is also likely to shift.
“The point at which Azerbaijan-Iran relations stood before the war is unlikely to remain unchanged. However, Iran must understand that Azerbaijan has taken the same position toward Iran that Iran has historically shown toward Azerbaijan. There is no reason for Tehran to expect anything more. Azerbaijani territory and airspace were not used against Iran—and that should define the limit of Iran’s expectations from Baku.”
In this context, Mammadov stressed the importance of Iran’s post-conflict policy.
“Azerbaijan is always open to constructive cooperation with Iran on all bilateral issues. In fact, Iran may even become more cooperative regarding transportation projects across its territory. This includes the North-South Corridor as well as the Araz Corridor, which connects mainland Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. Iran will now need additional investments and economic initiatives to rebuild its economy and offset the damage caused by the war,” Mammadov concluded.
Translated from 1news.az
