Russian President Vladimir Putin has suffered a major geopolitical defeat as a result of his full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He has accelerated the steps other former Soviet republics have been taking to distance themselves from Moscow (see EDM, July 22, 2025, February 3).
Nowhere have these moves been more fateful than in Azerbaijan. Baku now counts countries far beyond the borders of the former Soviet space other than Moscow as major partners. Azerbaijan’s relations with Moscow have sharply deteriorated over the last several years (see EDM, January 15, 2025, January 15).
As a result, there are signs that Azerbaijan may soon break with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization that Moscow has long hoped would prevent post-Soviet states from moving away from Russia (Minval Politika). Baku has made steps to strengthen relations with other outside powers, such as the United States, Türkiye, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in particular (see EDM, May 1, 14, September 10, 2025, January 28). These strengthening relations are promoting the demise of the former Soviet space as a geopolitical reality and the unchallenged Russian sphere of influence, regardless of the relationships they maintain with Moscow.
The limited territorial gains Putin has made as his expanded war in Ukraine enters its fifth year are far overshadowed by other developments. Not only have Russia’s losses in lives, treasure, and even legitimacy at home overshadowed this ongoing conflict, but its geopolitical defeats across the former Soviet space have been gaining traction. Country after country in the post-Soviet space have been distancing themselves from Moscow and breaking with, or at least not fully participating in, Moscow-organized structures such as the CIS. That has been recognized in Moscow and alarmed Russian analysts, who see it as a sign of Russia’s decline, even if it is sometimes ignored or downplayed in other capitals (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 11, 2023).
In the words of Russian journalist Stanislav Kucher back in 2023, what his country and the world are now witnessing is “the final collapse of the [Soviet Union] in the form of the departure of its ‘fragments’ from the orbit of the Russian Federation.” At present, he continues, “Russia has only one ally in the post-Soviet space: Belarus. The rest will either fence themselves off and arm themselves, or smile sweetly and then go ahead and arm themselves as well.” Given that, he concludes, “never before” has the CIS States been so meaningless and divided (Telegram/@StanislavKucher, December 7, 2023). Some of these have simply cut back their relationships with the CIS and Moscow, while others have slammed the door. The point, Kucher says, is they have left (see EDM, February 7, 2023).
Another Moscow expert, Aleksandr Dyukov of the Institute of Russian History, is even more despairing. He noted in November 2025 that the CIS has not achieved either of its two original purposes as a forum for “a civilized divorce” of the former union republics and as the basis of the maintenance of ties that had linked them together and could lead to the formation of a new union state (Svobodnaya Pressa, November 26, 2025).
Ever more of the former union republics are entering into relationships with each other and with other countries in ways that exclude Russia, Dyukov continues. Many of them are now its “competitors” rather than its “strategic partners,” however often they, or people in the Russian capital, say otherwise. Azerbaijan is a critically important example of this. It has built an alliance with Türkiye, thus becoming a competitor rather than an ally of Russia (see EDM, June 23, 2021). It will continue to act in that way even if its relations with Moscow should become more polite in the future.
There are compelling reasons for Dyukov’s pessimism. For over a decade, some in Baku have been calling for Azerbaijan to adopt a more independent line (Window on Eurasia, July 22, 2014). Both anger about Moscow’s overbearing language and actions, and especially Azerbaijan’s ever-closer ties with Türkiye and the United States, have fed those feelings. Relations with the United States have progressed through the U.S. role in brokering a settlement to Azerbaijan’s conflict with Armenia and through plans for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) corridor, which will link Azerbaijan with the West.
Many in Baku are also celebrating U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visit to the Caucasus this week (see EDM, August 12, 2025;Azernews, February 10). Just how far things have gone in that direction is reflected in an article by influential Baku foreign policy commentator A. Shakur, published on February 5 by the Minval outlet (Minval Politika, February 5). He writes, like aging actors who are of no interest to anyone but their aging fans, Russian officials have gone through the motions of trying to keep the CIS and the former Soviet space alive. In recent years, however, they have been capable “only of organizing informal summits” that the leaders of other countries may or may not attend. He pointedly notes that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has missed the last two (seeEDM, January 15).
Shakur continues:
In the 1990s, both Moscow and the West seriously considered that the CIS would become the framework under which the former Soviet republics would merge into a new confederation or federation. Publicly, the organization was presented as ‘a civilized divorce;’ but in reality, repeated attempts were made to establish supranational structures within it (Minval Politika, February 5).
Since then, he argues, “the CIS itself has in effect entered a vegetative state.” It has been an organization Moscow has “continued to try to use to promote supranational elements, including in such seemingly harmless areas as the teaching of the Russian language in other countries,” but that has lost all real significance (see EDM, October 31, 2024).
Those efforts and meetings cannot hide the reality that the CIS is already half dead, he continues. The three Baltic countries were never members, Georgia and Ukraine have left after Moscow invaded them, and Moldova and Armenia are preparing to withdraw. According to him, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan may soon follow, given their problems with Russia (Minval Politika, February 5). If Azerbaijan leaves, such exits will become even more likely. That will be the end, because Moscow has few resources at present to do anything about this approaching end of the former Soviet space. Its economy is not doing well, and both its use of force against its neighbors and mistreatment of citizens of these countries in Russia are only driving ever more of these states away from Russia.
Equally, or perhaps even more important, Shakur continues, countries beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union are “strengthening their positions,” including, but not limited to, the Organization of Turkic States, the PRC, the European Union, and the United States (see EDM, February 19, October 23, November 19, 20, 2025, January 21, 28). Shakur points out that “Azerbaijan’s closest allies—Türkiye and Pakistan—are not CIS members—nor are many of its main economic partners” (see EDM, October 23, 2024; Minval Politika, February 5).
This prompts “a fundamental question,” the commentator says. “What practical purpose does the CIS have for Azerbaijan, especially given Russia’s continuing ambitions within it,” including the use of naked force as in Ukraine? “Has the time not come,” he then asks rhetorically, “for Baku to leave this platform altogether?” If it takes that step, Shakur suggests, that will do more than destroy the CIS. It will undermine the notion that the post-Soviet space is more relevant to the geopolitical calculations of other countries than the interests and location of its current or past members (Minval Politika, February 5). There are hopeful signs that this new thinking is spreading not only in Moscow but also in Western capitals.
Paul Goble
