On March 6, the office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Israel is engaged in discussions with the United States “to establish a strong foundation for trilateral cooperation between Israel, Azerbaijan, and the U.S.” (The Jerusalem Post, March 6). This statement coincided with debates in the Knesset on “Upgrading the Strategic Alliance between Israel and Azerbaijan” (The Jerusalem Post, March 6). The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) highlighted Azerbaijan’s role as a “strategic ally in the Caucasus region,” with bilateral cooperation spanning security, trade, technology, and energy. Israeli National Missions Minister Orit Strock, speaking on behalf of the government, emphasized the unique and long-standing friendship between Israel and Azerbaijan (The Jerusalem Post, March 6).
The proposal for this trilateral format positions Azerbaijan as a crucial bridge between the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and the West. The initiative follows two visits by Hikmet Hajiyev, foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, to Israel in recent months. Hajiyev’s December 2024 visit to Israel was followed by another in mid-February, during which he met with Netanyahu (Report.az, December 9, 2024, February 19). According to Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, these discussions covered “recent developments in the Middle East and the Caucasus, regional security, and strong bilateral relations between Israel and Azerbaijan” (Report.az, December 9, 2024). Additionally, some reports suggest Azerbaijan may have been mediating between Israel and Türkiye (Caliber.az, December 11, 2024).
Baku has attempted to mediate between Israel and Türkiye in the past. In September 2023, during his visit to Israel, Hajiyev proposed a trilateral format involving Azerbaijan, Israel, and Türkiye, stating, “We would like our friends to be friends among themselves” (Report.az, September 7, 2023). Following the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, however, Ankara-Tel Aviv relations deteriorated, making this initiative unfeasible. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan remains committed to easing tensions, as suggested by Hajiyev’s recent visit to Türkiye following his trip to Israel (Qafqazinfo.az, February 25).
Unlike the Azerbaijan-Israel-Türkiye proposal, the Azerbaijan-Israel-U.S. initiative is a novel development. The deepening ties between Israel and Azerbaijan over three decades have created strong incentives to formalize and expand this relationship. Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s most important strategic partners, particularly in the areas of security and energy (The Jerusalem Post, March 6).
Energy cooperation remains a central component of this alliance. Azerbaijan supplies over 60 percent of Israel’s gasoline and increased oil exports to Israel by 55 percent during the Second Intifada and the war against Hamas and Hezbollah (Besacenter.org, January 15). A significant milestone came on March 17, when Azerbaijan and Israel signed an agreement for joint gas exploration (X/@MikayilJabbarov; Israeli Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure, March 17). This agreement enables the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), in partnership with U.K. company BP and Israel’s NewMed Energy, to explore natural gas in Zone I, situated within Israel’s northern Mediterranean exclusive economic zone (Report.az, March 17).
The Azerbaijan-Israel partnership is not only an economic partnership but also a strategic alignment against shared threats, particularly those posed by Iran. Azerbaijan’s secular governance and close ties with the West contrast sharply with Iran’s adversarial stance. Tehran has long perceived the Azerbaijan-Israel alliance as a challenge to its regional influence (Iran Daily, March 1). For Israel and the United States, however, Azerbaijan’s strategic importance extends beyond countering Iran. As a central hub on the Middle Corridor—a vital trade route linking Europe to Central Asia via the South Caucasus—Azerbaijan plays a crucial role in global supply chains (see EDM, April 20, 2023, October 28, 2024).
Both Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel and the change in U.S. leadership could positively impact Baku’s relations with Washington, thereby making the trilateral format possible. Under the Biden administration, U.S.-Azerbaijan relations faced setbacks, particularly after the 2024 reactivation of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which restricts U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan (see EDM, November 27, 2023). Adopted in 1992, Section 907 bars U.S. aid to Azerbaijan unless Baku takes “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” (U.S. Congress, October 24, 1992). This amendment had been waived annually since 2002, a policy that enabled U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation, including Baku’s decision to allow the United States to use Azerbaijani territory for supplying troops in Afghanistan (see EDM, November 27, 2023).
The reactivation of Section 907 after the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan drew criticism from Azerbaijan. “So, when you need us, you waive the sanctions. When you don’t need us any longer, you re-impose the sanctions. How can we build long-term relations with you?” Aliyev questioned during his address at the 12th Global Baku Forum on March 13 (President.az, March 13). He also expressed optimism, however, that relations between Washington and Baku would return to a more positive trajectory under the U.S. President Donald Trump administration, stating “we hope that with the new administration, we will rebuild our strong partnership” (President.az, March 13). Baku-Washington relations are likely to be positively affected by the new developments on the Israel-Azerbaijan track.
The establishment of a trilateral format among these three countries would mark a shift in regional alliances, reinforcing Azerbaijan’s role as a critical player in bridging the South Caucasus, the Middle East, and the West. This situation makes Azerbaijan also a potential candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords. Advocates of this idea argue that Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the accords would create new opportunities for cooperation with Israel and the United States beyond security–particularly within the Negev Forum, established in 2022 as a functional mechanism for implementing agreements among the United States, Israel, the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and Bahrain (Besacenter.org, March 15). Additionally, this could open a pathway to repealing the Section 907 Amendment. With the return of the Trump administration in 2025 and a renewed focus on strengthening Israel’s security, Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the accords could further solidify its position as a key regional actor, making the trilateral partnership more consequential.
Vasif Huseynov
