This initiative, highlighted by James O’Brien, the US Assistant Secretary of State, at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting, gains particular intrigue given the existence of a transport corridor through Georgia. However, it seems Washington intends to replace Georgia with Armenia as the transit link.
Washington’s rationale is clear. Relations between Georgia and its recent Western partners have strained, partly due to Tbilisi’s “disobedience” regarding the foreign influence transparency law. Conversely, Armenia, once seen as a Russian stronghold, now shows readiness to become a Western outpost. American diplomats have long advocated for a “pipeline of peace,” connecting Armenia to transcontinental transit. Geographically, the most convenient route from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean passes through Armenia.
Despite this, the corridor through Georgia already exists and functions, while a route through Armenia remains aspirational. Azerbaijan is the crucial link, regardless of whether the corridor passes through Georgia or Armenia. Azerbaijan has a well-established partnership with Georgia, with export pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway passing through it. Conversely, Azerbaijan recently exited a war with Armenia, and no peace treaty or open communications exist yet. Without this, the “transport corridor” envisioned by O’Brien is unworkable.
Moreover, Armenia’s reluctance to renounce constitutional claims to Karabakh and to discuss the “Zangezur corridor” hampers peace treaty preparations. The proposed routes through Armenia lack sufficient security guarantees.
If the US convinces Armenia to amend its constitution and open the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan would welcome it. However, Washington’s push for Armenia to abandon territorial claims to Azerbaijan is unclear. Traditional US policy often leaves negotiations to the involved parties. As long as Armenia’s constitution includes claims to Karabakh, Azerbaijan will not sign a peace treaty. Territorial integrity is a non-negotiable “red line” for Azerbaijan.
Additionally, Armenia’s pivot to the West is not yet definitive. While Armenia expresses grievances against Russia, it has not taken decisive steps past the “point of no return.” Removing Russian border guards from Zvartnots airport, based on informal agreements, is not a significant shift. Despite anti-Russian gestures in Armenia, no substantial changes occur.
Historically, in 2013, Armenia prepared to sign an association agreement with the EU but opted for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) shortly before signing. Armenia’s economy cannot survive without Russian oil and gas prices. Despite over a decade passing, this dependency remains. Russia has not pressured Armenia seriously, partly because Armenian PM Pashinyan has not crossed critical “red lines.” No Western allies are ready to financially support Armenia substantially. Consequently, despite Pashinyan’s pro-Western display, Armenia’s dependence on Russia persists, including CSTO membership and a Russian military base. Most Armenian infrastructure is under Russian control, including telecommunications, gas, and electricity networks, and railroads. Armenian borders with Iran and Turkey are also guarded by Russian border guards. Under these conditions, a transport corridor through Armenia, believed to be outside Russian control, is naive.
In summary, American diplomats might recall Rockefeller’s cynical yet apt saying: “A friendship founded on business is better than a business founded on friendship.” Despite sympathies for “long-suffering Christian Armenia” in the current administration, making a serious political bet on Armenia is premature and unlikely in the near future.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
