The prospect of integrating the energy systems of Azerbaijan and Armenia has triggered a stormy — even hysterical — reaction in Yerevan. Pro-Russian political and expert circles, which traditionally view any diversification of Armenia’s external ties as a threat to the familiar model of dependency, have been especially vocal in opposing the initiative announced by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
On January 21, answering questions from lawmakers in parliament, Pashinyan stated directly that the energy systems of the two countries would be interconnected. According to him, the decision is unequivocal and provides for the use of mutual electricity imports. He made it clear that this is not a situational idea but a direction that had been discussed earlier as well, including during direct talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.
As Pashinyan explained, he proposed launching practical cooperation not with railway infrastructure under the so-called “Trump route,” but with the construction of a high-voltage transmission line. From the prime minister’s perspective, this would require less time and investment and could deliver a faster economic effect. This approach is also reflected in the framework document signed in early January between the United States and Armenia, which envisages not only the construction of a railway and highway but also a high-voltage power line and a fiber-optic cable.
According to available information, the interconnection of the Azerbaijani and Armenian power systems could be implemented earlier than other infrastructure projects. In recent years, Azerbaijan has built a modern energy network in the liberated territories, making a technical connection with the Armenian system feasible, particularly in the direction of the Lachin district.
For Armenia, energy is not only an economic issue but also a strategic one. The country remains heavily dependent on Russia: about 40 percent of all electricity generation comes from the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, whose fuel supply and operation involve Moscow. A significant share of other generating capacities is also controlled by Russian companies. Against this backdrop, reducing energy dependence on Russia has become an especially sensitive priority for Yerevan in recent years.
The paradox is that Armenia produces more electricity than it consumes. As Deputy Minister of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure Hakob Vardanyan stated at the Eurasian Economic Forum in 2024, Armenia is capable of generating up to an additional 7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually for export. With current production and consumption both around 7 billion kilowatt-hours per year, a large share of capacity is effectively idle, while maintenance costs are borne by Armenian consumers.
According to Vardanyan, this is why Armenia supports the creation of a unified energy market within the Eurasian Economic Union. He emphasized that integration would allow existing capacities to be utilized and would reduce the financial burden on the domestic market. At the same time, the deputy minister openly acknowledged that Armenia has no direct energy links with Russia or other EAEU countries, which objectively limits its export potential.
In this context, connecting Armenia’s grid with Azerbaijan opens fundamentally new opportunities. Azerbaijan’s power system is synchronized with the grids of Russia and Georgia, and through Georgian territory operates in parallel mode with Türkiye. This means that Armenian electricity could transit through Azerbaijan to the markets of Georgia and Russia, and, in the event of normalization of relations, to Türkiye as well. In effect, Armenia would gain access to a regional energy market that remains closed to it without Azerbaijan’s participation.
However, this very aspect has become the main target of criticism from the Armenian opposition and pro-Russian experts, who accuse Pashinyan of allegedly “handing over the keys” of the country’s energy system to Baku and Ankara.
The head of the parliamentary faction of the “I Have Honor” party, Hayk Mamijanyan, called the idea of integrating the grids a “threat to Armenia’s sovereignty,” arguing that transferring control over energy flows to another country is equivalent to losing control over strategic resources. In his interpretation, Prime Minister Pashinyan is “handing the switch” to Azerbaijan.
Similar rhetoric is used by energy and international relations expert Armen Manvelyan, who warned of high technical risks in integrating the systems and of possible large-scale failures and prolonged power outages. According to Manvelyan, the interconnection could allegedly lead to a collapse of the entire infrastructure. He further claims that the real goal of Azerbaijan and Türkiye is to turn Armenia into a dependent consumer and to shut down the Metsamor NPP, while the only viable option, in his view, is continued reliance on Russia, which he says is ready to modernize the sector and build new nuclear plants.
The same narrative is promoted by the media outlet Sputnik Armenia, which labels the potential integration of power systems as “dangerous.” Its publications argue that by becoming involved in an energy confrontation between Russia and the collective West, the Armenian authorities are gradually drawing the country into risky geopolitical projects that weaken sovereignty and increase dependence on the United States, Türkiye, and Azerbaijan.
It is also emphasized that Yerevan’s talks with Washington on building modular nuclear power plants to replace the Metsamor NPP — whose operating life expires in 2036 — signal a departure from traditional cooperation with Moscow in the nuclear sector. In the interpretation of pro-Russian media, the interconnection with Azerbaijan represents yet another step toward Armenia’s exit from Russia’s sphere of influence.
“Transfer of management and operation of networks, electricity trading, and redistribution of flows create conditions under which Baku gains strategic influence over Armenia’s critical infrastructure,” Sputnik warns, calling this the “inevitable outcome of energy rapprochement under American accompaniment.”
Notably, a similar campaign unfolded earlier around fuel supplies from Azerbaijan to Armenia. At the time, the same circles labeled the development “dangerous” and even called for a boycott of Azerbaijani fuel. Yet market logic proved stronger than political slogans: the first batch of gasoline, offered at a price significantly lower than Russian fuel, sold out within just a few days.
Subsequently, Baku shipped larger volumes of gasoline and diesel fuel to Armenia, and other suppliers, in order to retain their market positions, were forced to cut prices by around 20 percent.
This experience clearly demonstrates that behind loud rhetoric about “handing over the switch” and “loss of sovereignty” often lies a fear of losing monopolistic control.
In reality, the issue of integrating the energy systems of Azerbaijan and Armenia is less about threats and more about a choice between closed dependence and an open regional market, where economic logic gradually displaces political phobias.
Farhad Mammadov
haqqin.az
