The South Caucasus had a good year. The most bitter conflict that emerged during the disintegration of the USSR between Armenia and Azerbaijan was resolved with the signing of a peace agreement in the White House. Although US President Donald Trymp presided over the signing his input into the peace process was marginal at best.
Conflicts in Moldova, Georgia and Chechnya had also broken out three decades ago but that between Armenia and Azerbaijan was the most intractable. Russia backed separatists in Moldova and Georgia but did not openly annex these enclaves. In Chechnya, Russia fought a movement for independence from the Russian Federation.
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was different because Armenian resembled Russian nationalists in pursuing irredentist expansionism towards neighbouring states. After its victory in the 1988-1992 First Karabakh War, Armenia occupied a fifth of Azerbaijan for nearly three decades that was ethnically cleansed of its Azerbaijani inhabitants. Since 2014, Russia has annexed a fifth of Ukraine. Ten percent of Azerbaijanis, one million, became internally displaced persons. Russia’s occupation of Ukraine has also affected ten percent of Ukraine’s population, with two million Ukrainians deported to Russia and another 3.7 million fleeing these territories and becoming internally displaced persons.
Armenia relinquished its expansionist project of a ‘Greater Armenia’ (or ‘historical Armenia’) only after territory it was occupying was taken back by Azerbaijan in 2020 and 2023. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, opposed by angry Armenian nationalist, the Armenian diaspora, and the Armenian Apostolic Church, declared that Armenia must accept that its international borders are those Armenia possessed as republican boundaries in the USSR, or what he called ‘real Armenia.’ This represented a major shift from Armenian nationalism and was central to his government’s drive for a peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the normalization of relations with Turkey.
Pashinyan argued that pursuing ‘historical Armenia’ — which includes territories within Azerbaijan and Türkiye — has only led to conflict, isolation. Pashinyan also realised that as long as Armenia was isolated it would have to remain within Russia’s sphere of influence. A peace agreement would therefore open the door to lessening Armenian ties with Russia and renewing integration into Europe that had been halted a decade ago under Kremlin pressure.
Ukraine is continuing to fight Russia’s occupation of its territory in a brutal war that has cost 1.2 million Russian military casualties and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian civilian and military losses. Russia has yet to accept – unlike Armenia – that its international borders should also be those of the Soviet Russian republican boundaries.
The signing of a peace agreement in the White House opened the door to a resolution of the Zangezur Corridor that travels 42 kms from Azerbaijan through the Armenia’s Syunik province to the Azerbaijani province of Nakhchivan. The US brokered its resolution with the creation of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) that would bypass Iran and reduce Russian influence. Increased economic integration and trade will come from the restoration of road, rail, and pipeline links. Armenia is set to benefit from joining Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Georgia in the international transportation of oil and gas through the South Caucasus.
Russia and Iran are spoilers. They both do not wish to see a reduction in their influence in the South Caucasus at the expense of the United States and Europe. Both Russian presidents – Boris Yeltsyn and Vladimir Putin – have viewed the former USSR as Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence and have lobbied and demanded the UN, NATO and EU not move into in the region. Persian nationalists have traditionally viewed the South Caucasus as part of Iran’s sphere of influence.
Russia and Iran are xenophobically anti-American. Russia views the war in Ukraine as a proxy war against the West with Ukraine a US puppet state. Iran’s theocratic regime has always been hostile to the ‘great Satan’ – the USA, especially after Trump supported Israel and launched attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities.
With a large diaspora in the US, anti-Americanism is unpopular in Armenia. Anti-Americanism is also a non-starter in Azerbaijan. Pashinyan is reaching out to the large Armenian diaspora in France to help promote European integration.
The Kremlin is heavily pre-occupied in fighting a large war in Ukraine and its influence in and ability to cajole Eurasian states, is in decline. At the UN only Belarus supports Russia in votes on resolutions condemning Russia’s occupation of Ukraine and human rights violations in occupied Ukrainian territories. Following Azerbaijan’s lead, Kazakhstan is launching military reforms that include a $1 billion project to build four new factories producing NATO-standard artillery and mines. With an eye towards a fifty percent collapse in Russian arms sales, the Kremlin has declared the move to NATO military standards as ‘unfriendly.’ Russian military equipment in Ukraine has been shown to be of poor quality.
Russia does though have leverage over Armenia in its membership of the moribund CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU). In 2013, Russia successfully pressured Armenia to drop its signing of an Association Agreement with the EU and instead join the EaEU.
Adopted in December 2025, the Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership, is an overly ambitious plan to deepen cooperation under the existing Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with 3-4 year short-term and 7 year medium-term 7-year goals. Will the EU’s enhanced cooperation with Armenia strengthen the path to peace in the South Caucasus or lead to Azerbaijan’s marginalisation from Europe?
The Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership focuses on reinforced security and defence with a focus on hybrid threats, cyber resilience, and crisis management, economic diversification, international connectivity, governance reforms such as the rule of law and democracy through the Resilience and Growth Plan, and mobility in areas like visa liberalisation.
EU-Arm documdnt contains the references to Karabakh conflict. It is unfortunate as this conflict was a Russian instrument of control.
The final big question is which countries, and international organisations will provide assistance to the South Caucasus to assist in it overcoming three decades of conflict. Russia’s dire financial situation because of the drain on its resources from its war against Ukraine and Western sanctions precludes it providing financial assistance to other countries. The EU has cut off Georgia which is sliding into pro-Russian authoritarian regime.
Meanwhile, despite its importance to Europe’s energy security, Azerbaijan is largely ignored by the EU. Armenia is alone in benefitting from EU assistance. Nearly one million Azerbaijanis were removed or fled from Armenia and occupied Azerbaijan in the early 1990s and their housing and social needs have only been met by the Azerbaijani government. The Strategic Agenda for the EU-Armenia Partnership only talks of ‘addressing the needs and supporting the socio-economic inclusion of Karabakh Armenians displaced following Azerbaijan’s military operation’ and ‘the social inclusion of women and girls and persons in vulnerable situations, such as Karabakh Armenians.’
Looking ahead to 2026, peace has descended upon a strategically important region – South Caucasus – which experienced the greatest conflict during the disintegration of the USSR. In 2026 Armenians and Azerbaijanis will build on their peace agreement to increase trade and expand Armenia’s security with Europe and Azerbaijans with the Turkic World.
Taras Kuzio is a professor of political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.
