When people say that Russia cannot be understood with reason, they apparently mean its foreign policy. The story of the South Caucasus is a vivid confirmation of this sad axiom. A strategically important region, bound to Russia not only by geography but also by history, culture, economic interests, and finally, military presence, is literally slipping out of control. The process began long ago, but its peak seems to have come now: Armenia — Russia’s faithful ally for decades — is openly expressing dissatisfaction. Moreover, in Yerevan there are increasing calls to reconsider relations with Moscow, even including the withdrawal of the 102nd Russian military base from Gyumri. This is no longer just an alarming signal — it is an alarm bell.
Losing Azerbaijan could be understood. Baku has always followed its own path, maneuvering between the interests of Turkey, the West, and Russia. Unlike Yerevan, Azerbaijan was never part of the CSTO or the EAEU, never relied solely on Moscow. It consistently strengthened ties with Ankara, developed energy projects bypassing Russian routes, and demonstrated a high level of pragmatism in international politics. Moscow understood this, and therefore never counted on a firm alliance.
But Armenia is a completely different case. It was Russia’s outpost in the Caucasus, the last island of real influence in the region. A Russian military base, energy dependence, trade preferences, close security ties, and decades of loyalty — all this created the illusion of an unshakable union. Yet, as it turned out, even a fortress that seems monolithic can crumble if not reinforced in time. And the Bastille has fallen…
The turning point was the Second Karabakh War in 2020. When Armenia, despite its formal alliance with Russia, was left one-on-one with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Moscow chose the position of an observer. This caused deep disappointment in Armenian society and among its elites. Even the deployment of peacekeepers in Karabakh after the ceasefire agreement did not change the overall perception: Russia was no longer a guarantor of security.
Subsequent events — the blockade of the Lachin corridor, the inaction of Russian peacekeepers, the loss of control over Karabakh, and finally the departure of the Armenian population — only reinforced this image. Armenia feels used and abandoned.
Russia, bogged down in the war in Ukraine, proved incapable of paying proper attention to the Caucasus. Others seized the opportunity. The U.S. and EU increased their diplomatic activity, while France openly pursued strategic rapprochement with Armenia. Brussels and Washington are offering Yerevan alternative paths of development, including military-technical cooperation, economic investment, and security guarantees.
Armenia is betting on diversification of its foreign policy. The country is signing agreements with the EU, developing ties with India, Iran, Greece, and others. And most importantly, rhetoric about the need to “step out of Moscow’s shadow” is being heard more often. Symbolic was the refusal to participate in CSTO exercises, criticism of the organization, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s statement that Armenia had made a “mistake” by relying on a single ally.
The situation is worsening not only on the international stage, but also domestically. Anti-Russian rallies in Yerevan, protests against the 102nd base, street slogans about “Russian betrayal” and the “need for sovereignty” are growing louder. Even at the government level, harsh assessments are being voiced. In interviews with Western media, Pashinyan stresses that “Armenia must stop being a vassal” and gain independence from Moscow. In society, there is increasing demand for reform of the army along Western lines, for revising the security concept, and for breaking dependence on Russian arms supplies. This is not a temporary wave of emotions — it is a systemic shift. The Kremlin, it seems, does not notice or pretends that nothing is happening.
Why did the Kremlin “lose” Armenia?
There are many reasons, but the key one is strategic shortsightedness. The Kremlin was too sure that Armenia would not go anywhere. The bet was on inertia, on old ties, on gratitude for the “past.” Yet international politics is not a thank-you dinner. It requires effort, attention, balancing of interests, and real guarantees.
Another reason is neglect of public opinion in allied countries. Moscow traditionally built relations with elites, ignoring the fact that in the 21st century elites are far more dependent on electorates and public opinion. And when Armenian society massively turned away from Russia, no one in the Kremlin really tried to stop it.
Consequences
The loss of Armenia is not just a diplomatic failure. It is a blow to the entire architecture of Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. It signals to other allies — in Central Asia, Belarus, Transnistria — that Moscow cannot be fully relied upon. It undermines Russia’s image as a guarantor of security and strategic partnership. Moreover, it opens the South Caucasus to Turkey and the West. Armenia is gradually integrating into the European and Euro-Atlantic system. NATO is already developing dialogue with Yerevan, and American diplomats are making frequent visits to the region. This means that Russian positions will be squeezed out not tomorrow, but quite possibly within the coming years.
Yes, if Russia in 2020 had behaved differently. Yes, if the Kremlin had treated Armenia not as a “younger brother,” but as an equal partner. If Russia had realized that even loyalty needs to be sustained by real actions. But history knows no “ifs.” Now Moscow is faced with a new reality, in which even former allies are seeking new guarantors. And here, it has only itself to blame…
Fakhri Akifoglu
Translated from minval.az
