In his posthumously published memoirs, Iranian political heavyweight Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani recalled his meetings with Heydar Aliyev, then president of Azerbaijan, during the first Nagorno-Karabakh war in November 1993. According to Rafsanjani, Aliyev was demanding that Iran provide military support to Azerbaijan in the conflict with Armenia.
Rafsanjani wrote: “One of his constant remarks was that Iran should seize the opportunity of the war with the Armenians to expand its presence in Azerbaijan. At times, he even mentioned that Azerbaijan belonged to Iran, urging us to come, defend it, and take control.”
He added: “When we were in Nakhchivan, he said similar things. He argued that if Iran brought Azerbaijan under its influence, it would shake Russia’s dominance over the entire Caucasus.”
Thirty-two years later, the tables have turned. No longer do Azerbaijani officials seek Tehran’s involvement in Baku’s affairs.
Now it is Iranian politicians who seem unsure how to manage relations with a small but assertive neighbour. A neighbour that gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, but was once part of Iran before being ceded to the Russian Empire through the treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828).
Over the past decade, the power dynamic between the two countries has shifted significantly. Some Azerbaijani figures and media outlets are now even calling for the annexation of parts of Iranian territory.
Meanwhile, Iran’s recent 12-day war with Israel and the United States has deepened the political divide. In Tehran concerns are mounting over Azerbaijan’s expanding military and intelligence ties with Israel.
Where did the Israeli drones come from?
Right after Israel’s war on Iran ended, residents near Iran’s northwestern border reported sightings of Israeli drones entering from the direction of Azerbaijan. These accounts were later echoed by Iran’s state broadcaster, whose director is appointed by the supreme leader. The reports suggested that drones used in attacks on cities including Tehran, Tabriz and Urmia have crossed into Iran from Azerbaijan.
The claims drew enough attention that foreign ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei was asked about them during a news conference. “We shared the cases with the neighbouring countries, and we are following up on this issue,” he said. A few days later, Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian stated that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had assured him that Israel had not used Azerbaijani territory to launch attacks.
This reassurance did not convince many in Iran. Neither the media nor political experts accepted it.
A Tehran-based professor of international relations, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the fact that both the foreign ministry and the president discussed the matter shows how serious it is for Iran.
“If Iran wasn’t sure about Israeli involvement from the Azerbaijani border, it wouldn’t have brought it up at such a high level,” the expert said.
He also argued that Pezeshkian’s comments about Aliyev’s assurances show the failure of Iran’s foreign policy in the Caucasus.
“What Pezeshkian said is just diplomatic language. In reality, Iran hasn’t known how to deal with Azerbaijan since the last Karabakh war. Since then, Azerbaijan has gone from being a friendly – or at least neutral – country to a quiet but serious threat.”
He pointed to high-level meetings between Azerbaijani and Israeli officials as further evidence of close collaboration between Baku and Tel Aviv.
Israel on Iran’s doorstep
After breaking from the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan first grew close to Turkey, Iran’s regional rival. Later, it also deepened its military and economic ties with Israel, which Iran sees as its main enemy.
In recent years, Azerbaijan has become one of the leading suppliers of oil and gas to Israel, while importing advanced Israeli military and intelligence equipment. According to some reports, Israel provided nearly 70 percent of Azerbaijan’s military arsenal between 2016 and 2020.
Now, Azerbaijan is also working with the new Syrian government, which has shifted away from Iran after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.
“With no clear strategy in the Caucasus, Iran is now watching as Tel Aviv moves closer to its borders,” the expert said.
He stressed that a new regional alliance between Israel, Syria and Azerbaijan could soon bring Israel to Iran’s doorstep through Turkey. The only obstacle is the 43km stretch of land between Armenia and Iran that links Azerbaijan to its exclave, Nakhchivan.
Control over this pass, also known as the Meghri or Zangezur corridor, has been a key demand from both Azerbaijan and Turkey since the 44-day Karabakh war in 2020. If war breaks out again between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Iran fears this corridor could fall into Azerbaijani hands.
The expert warned that Azerbaijan is not just aligning itself with Israel, but it is also copying its military strategies.
“In recent years, Azerbaijan has favoured short but intense wars. This approach has helped it reach its goals. That’s why another war with Armenia seems likely. In the long run, Iran should prepare for potential military pressure from its northwest. Even now, we’re hearing louder voices from Azerbaijan calling for parts of Iranian territory,” he said.
Demand for separating Iran’s regions
The expert was referring to increasing calls from some Azerbaijani figures for the separation of Iran’s Turkish-speaking regions. Pan-Turkists refer to those areas as “South Azerbaijan.” These include the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan, and even parts of Iran’s Kurdish regions.
Supporters of a Greater Kurdistan and Greater Armenia also claim some of these same areas.
One of the latest campaigns promoting separation came after the 12-day war from the media outlet Araznews on X. The campaign, in Persian and Turkish, called for unity between the Turks of Tabriz in Iran, Baku in Azerbaijan, and Ankara in Turkey. Many participants shared videos of themselves flashing the hand sign of the far-right Grey Wolves group.
In another example, Azerbaijani news outlet Caliber ran an English-language report describing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the “main enemy of the Azeris”.
A retired Iranian diplomat, who worked in the foreign ministry in the years after Azerbaijan gained independence, said these tactics started soon after Azerbaijan lost the first Karabakh war (1988-94).
“Once Baku realised it couldn’t drag Iran into a military conflict with Armenia, it quickly turned to Iran’s enemy, Israel,” said the former diplomat. “There were concerns, but Azerbaijan wasn’t seen as a major player in military, political, or economic terms, so Iran didn’t develop a clear policy toward it.”
That calculation has since changed.
‘Active neutrality’
Azerbaijan has built strong military ties with Israel and boosted its economy through oil and gas exports. But according to the diplomat, Iran’s approach towards Azerbaijan has not shifted.
Iran has called its stance “active neutrality” in the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia – a policy that, the former diplomat argues, has now backfired.
“Iran is paying the price for this so-called neutrality. It may have made sense early on, but as Azerbaijan grew closer to Israel, it ended up hurting Iran. In reality, it wasn’t neutrality, it was passivity.”
He also dismissed the Iranian government’s claim that its opposition to the Zangezur Corridor is about preserving trade routes to Europe through Armenia. Trade data from 2023 shows Iran exported just $412m worth of goods to Armenia and imported only $45m.
Instead, he pointed to two deeper reasons for Iran’s stance: first, its long-standing policy of aligning with Russian interests in the region; second, its fear of Israel getting too close to its borders.
“The establishment’s leaders never expected to face a security threat from Azerbaijan. They focused on expanding their influence in Arab countries and didn’t see this coming. That’s where they got caught off guard.”
While he declined to confirm whether Israel used Azerbaijani airspace in the recent attacks, the diplomat said Azerbaijan’s use of Israeli-made drones, surveillance tech, and defence systems is clear proof of how far Israeli influence has reached.
Right now, he added, Iran has no choice but to engage in diplomacy with Azerbaijan. But in the long run, that may only make things worse and give Israel another pressure point to use against Tehran.
“Whether or not Israel launched attacks from Azerbaijani territory, the real issue is that Iran knows it’s vulnerable on its northwest border. The question now is whether the high-ranking decision makers will act, or continue down the same failed path of ‘active neutrality’,” the diplomat said.
