Azerbaijan responded the same weekend by cancelling all cultural events organized by Russian state and private institutions and detaining journalists of Kremlin-linked Sputnik operating out of the capital Baku.
The rising tensions were accompanied by Russian disinformation attacks against Azerbaijan, going as far as to declare “Russia’s next war front after Ukraine”. Relations sank to their lowest point since December 25, when Russia shot down an Azerbaijani airliner.
The tensions have been simmering since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This was primarily because of Russian support to Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where the Armenians claimed territories within internationally-recognized borders of Azerbaijan. While Russia never officially entered the conflict on either side, it provided extensive diplomatic and materiel support to Yerevan. The Armenian-occupied Republic of Artsakh, a breakaway region of Azerbaijan, was recognized by the Russian proxy areas of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.
In the First Nagorno-Karabakh War from 1992 to 1994, Russia supplied Armenia with arms worth around $1 billion. However, after the Armenian victory Moscow also sold weapons to Azerbaijan. The Kremlin’s goal was to have both sides locked in struggle for as long as possible, allowing Moscow to maintain its influence over the South Caucasus.
Following the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, Russia brokered very favorable terms for itself, inserting Russia peacekeepers into the disputed territory with its security services act as “supervisors” of all vital transit routes.
Russia’s stranglehold over Armenia and Azerbaijan started to loosen with Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In September 2023, Azerbaijan capitalized with a two-day offensive ousting Armenian forces out of the disputed territories. The unrecognized Artsakh Republic ceased to exist and was officially dissolved on January 1, 2024.
Separating from Russia
While Russia does trades with and via Iran through the Caspian Sea, it also needs Azerbaijan to supplement the water route with a railway. Iran is currently building the track between Astara, on its border with Azerbaijan, and Rasht on the Caspian Sea. Doingo, it would complete a rail connection with Russia via Azerbaijan.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan needs transport through either Georgia or Armenia for trade routes into Turkey and further into Europe.
The recent pro-Western pivot of Armenia brings cautious optimism. Last year Yerevan suspended its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. It expelled border guards of the Russian State security service FSB from the Yerevan International airport.
Earlier this year Armenia took control of all its border checkpoints from the Russians. Two weeks ago, its parliament approved the nationalization of the only electric power distributor in Armenia, which had belonged to Russian-Armenian oligarch Samwell Karapetyan.
Supported by the normalization of relations with Turkey, a long-time backer of Azerbaijan, Armenia could complete a peace treaty without Moscow’s oversight.
Turkey and the European Unions would be wise to capitalize on the growing rifts between Russia and both Baku and Yerevan. The South Caucasus is vital for access to Central Asia, rich in oil, natural gas, rare earth metals, and uranium.
Countering Moscow’s Influence
The Kremlin’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 was in part motivated by the development of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, completely bypassing Russia. Before the invasion, Moscow sabotaged the pipeline. During the war, the Russian Air Force attempted multiple times to bomb it. In 2015, Russia seized another Georgian pipeline, Baku-Supsa, transporting Azerbaijani oil to the Black Sea.
Continued to occupy Abkhazia and South Ossetia within the internationally-recognized borders of Georgia and effectively capturing the Georgian government, Russia is in no hurry to relinquish control. This leaves only Armenia and (not or) Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus as potential partners for the EU if they wish to trade with Central Asia.
Both need to be approached cautiously. Armenia is still part of the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia’s imitation of the EU. The Russians maintain a military presence in Armenia at the 102nd military base in Gyumri, and reportedly reinforced the position last week.
Oil-rich Azerbaijan is less dependent on trade with Russia. However, it could be influenced by Moscow if Russia manages to secure a Nagorno-Karabakh peace treaty favorable to Baku or if Moscow sabotages pipelines critical to the Azeri economy.
But with indications that Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are on course for an agreement on the Zangezur Corridor, entirely bypassing both Russia and Iran, we might be on a track where Moscow’s economic and strategic influence fades into the background.
Monique Camarra
