The recent wave of intensified pressure, humiliating rhetoric, and violence against migrants and non-Russian ethnic groups in Russia serves several strategic objectives, according to Milli Majlis MP Elchin Mirzabeyli.
One of the main goals, he stated, is Moscow’s interference in the conflict between Armenia’s government and the Armenian Apostolic Church—an example of Russia’s multifaceted strategy to maintain influence in the region.
“Tensions between Pashinyan’s government and the Church have peaked. The Church accuses Pashinyan of betraying traditional values and leaning toward the West, while Pashinyan is trying to curb the Church’s political influence. As a result, the radical ultranationalist segment of Armenian society has rallied around the Church,” said Mirzabeyli.
For a long time, Moscow has supported the Church in Armenia as a soft power tool and a mechanism of political leverage, he added. Its historic ties with the Russian Orthodox Church and alignment with Moscow’s “traditional values” narrative make the Armenian Church a pillar of Russian imperial continuity in Armenia and the wider South Caucasus.
In this context, violence against Azerbaijanis and Muslim migrants sends a dual message: domestically, it signals to Russia’s radical electorate that the state is using an “iron fist” to assert dominance; externally, it signals to ultranationalist groups aligned with the Armenian Church that Moscow is fighting a “Turkic-Muslim threat” in the Caucasus, thus affirming its authority.
In other words, police brutality, killings, and the use of terms like “ethnic criminality” by Russian law enforcement not only foster Islamophobia within Russia but also serve as a message to certain circles in Armenia: “Russia is your eternal ally, and our common enemy is the Turkic-Muslim world.”
Amid the violence against Azerbaijanis, Moscow is also signaling to the Church and ultranationalist factions in Armenia: “We are taking a hard stance against your historical enemies. Without our protection, no one in the region can shield you from Turkic-Muslim dominance. Use this narrative in your propaganda.”
This is a multi-layered strategy aimed at reinforcing Russia’s regional position while also consolidating nationalist sentiment at home.
At the same time, Russian political elites are attempting to redirect the semi-concealed discontent—stemming from economic hardship, international isolation due to the war in Ukraine, and rising social tensions—toward scapegoats. Historically, Russia has used the image of an “internal enemy” during times of political and economic crisis. Anti-migrant rhetoric fits squarely into this classic strategy.
A key ideological pillar of these developments is the notion of the “leading role of the Russian people,” a core element of the imperial mindset embedded in Russian statehood.
Chauvinist slogans like “Russia for Russians” and discriminatory policies reveal that the country’s multiethnic federal model is in decline, giving way to aggressive centralization.
Migrants, who are often employed in the lowest-paid and most physically demanding jobs, are being pitted against impoverished segments of the Russian population. Authorities deliberately fuel this resentment by blaming foreigners for socioeconomic problems.
While this tactic may yield short-term political dividends, it risks destabilizing Russia in the long term, deepening ethnic and religious divides. In today’s world, framing ethnic and religious diversity as a threat only exacerbates societal fractures.
Figures like Vladimir Solovyov exploit this situation by reinforcing narratives of an “internal enemy and external threat.” This rhetoric paints Azerbaijani migrants and Turkic-speaking peoples as a danger—capitalizing on deeply rooted stereotypes. It is driven by both Islamophobia and Turkophobia. At the same time, Russia signals to nationalists: “Any neighbor who refuses our dominance is a bad neighbor,” Mirzabeyli noted, as quoted by AzerTaj.
He emphasized that the chauvinist, discriminatory, and Islamophobic policies currently pursued against Azerbaijanis, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Turkmens, and other Turkic and Muslim peoples are no accident. These actions are orchestrated by ruling political elites and represent a continuation—now more overt and brutal—of imperial policies practiced for centuries.
“To understand the essence of Russia’s current domestic and foreign policy, just look at what’s happening in Ukraine. If Moscow shows such cruelty toward a closely related Slavic nation, murdering civilians in Bucha and other cities, razing villages, and displacing millions, it’s no surprise that it behaves with even greater ruthlessness toward other peoples,” he said.
In the 1990s, skinhead gangs known for brutal attacks on people from Central Asia and the Caucasus operated under the protection of the security services. In today’s Russia, such groups are no longer needed—this role is now openly performed by the police, OMON, and the FSB. The crimes committed against Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg are a clear confirmation of this. The details of the incident reveal that hatred toward other ethnicities is being supported at the state level.
“The term ‘ethnic crime,’ introduced by Russian law enforcement, is part of this agenda. The goal is to label people from Central Asia and the Caucasus as criminals in advance, shape public opinion, and lay the legal groundwork for future persecution. Today’s Russian repressions have already surpassed even Stalin-era methods. Back then, at least a formal trial was held before sending people to Siberian camps. Now, torture and killings happen in the streets and in homes—and have become normalized.”
“For many years, Russia has not been exporting security and stability to the region—but oppression and ethnic discrimination,” Mirzabeyli concluded.
“These developments are not random. Azerbaijan’s independent, interest-based foreign policy and growing regional influence are increasingly disturbing to Russian political and media elites. That is why their rhetoric has become more aggressive. But this pressure is temporary—it does not alter reality. On the contrary, such attacks against Azerbaijan only further strengthen our society’s unity, sense of national solidarity, and composed diplomatic stance.”
Translated from minval.az
