Over the past week, the conflict between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Catholicos of All Armenians Garegin II has reached a new level of escalation. Pashinyan publicly accused Garegin II of violating his vow of celibacy and demanded clarification on the matter.
In response, the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) issued a statement condemning the Prime Minister’s actions as an attempt to undermine the Church’s authority and interfere in its internal affairs. Church hierarchs emphasized that Pashinyan’s rhetoric violates norms of public conduct and offends the religious sentiments of believers.
The conflict also manifested in an incident at the Marmashen Monastery in Shirak Province, where a verbal confrontation occurred between church supporters and government representatives. The trigger was a post by the monastery’s abbot warning Pashinyan’s supporters against visiting the monastery grounds.
Amid increasingly active efforts by the Church to engage in Armenia’s political processes on the side of the opposition, authorities fear that a consolidation of former regime supporters with the Church could significantly weaken the ruling “Civil Contract” party both domestically and abroad, especially ahead of the next parliamentary elections scheduled for next year. Notably, the Church has launched anti-Pashinyan campaigns not only in Russia but also in the West, reportedly under the direct instruction of Garegin II.
Pashinyan, for his part, is doing everything he can to discredit the Armenian Catholicos in the eyes of the public. In this context, his proposal to change the procedure for electing the Catholicos—giving the state a decisive role and vetting candidates for integrity—has drawn attention.
The situation continues to evolve, and the future actions of both sides may have a significant impact on state-church relations in Armenia.
On June 6, Nikol Pashinyan again addressed Garegin II, demanding a response to the allegations of violating his vow of celibacy.
“What does Garegin II’s silence mean? We, his flock, expect a public explanation regarding his breach of celibacy and the existence of a child,” the Armenian Prime Minister wrote in a Facebook post.
According to Pashinyan, whether or not an answer is given, either outcome carries serious implications for the Catholicos’s spiritual standing.
“Silence implies consent and effectively places him outside the Primatial See. Telling the truth also means removing himself from the Primatial See. Lying—likewise,” Pashinyan stated.
In his efforts, the Armenian Prime Minister may find support among clergy who share his criticism and would not oppose removing Garegin. However, such priests are currently in the minority and tend to express their views in a more restrained manner.
Following the 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” a number of young priests (especially in the provinces) voiced support for “cleansing” not only the government but also the Church of corruption, nepotism, and ties to the former regime. Some declared their support for separating the Church from politics.
Among parish priests and seminary students, there is growing fatigue with Garegin II’s perceived “monopoly.” Some believe Church reform is necessary, and in that sense, Pashinyan’s ideas are resonating.
In certain foreign dioceses of the Armenian Apostolic Church—such as in the U.S. and France—clergy tend to avoid harsh criticism of Pashinyan and emphasize the importance of a secular state. While not open support, this stance contrasts with the radical criticism seen inside Armenia.
For example, in April 2025, Bishop Vazgen, newly appointed head of the Baltic States Diocese, warmly welcomed Nikol Pashinyan to the Armenian Church in Tallinn. He not only opened the church doors to the Prime Minister but also prayed with him and blessed his initiatives related to EU integration. This gesture drew sharp criticism from some clergy and members of the public, who deemed such behavior unacceptable.
At the same time, public exposure of sensitive issues involving the Church’s top hierarchs could intensify criticism of Garegin II’s leadership—not just within Armenia but also abroad—and potentially trigger a schism in the Church, which would play into Pashinyan’s hands.
It is known that some influential figures within the Armenian Church, such as Jerusalem Patriarch Nourhan Manougian, have accused the Catholicos of concentrating too much power and having material interests. In 2013, Manougian even sent a letter expressing dissatisfaction with Garegin’s actions, indicating internal divisions within the Church.
In any case, the confrontation between the state and the Church is intensifying, and the campaign to discredit Garegin II has clearly begun. Pashinyan, for his part, seems unwilling to ease the pressure. The Catholicos, meanwhile, appears to have taken a pause, seemingly aware that any move he makes could further fuel the campaign against him.
Ilgar Velizade
