Those who were uncomfortable with Türkiye’s consistent stance in foreign policy introduced a contrived term into the international relations literature years ago: “axis shift.” When Ankara embarked on an independent foreign policy by advancing its vision of a strong Türkiye (both on the ground and at the negotiating table) President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan put an end to these discussions on Jan. 10, 2024, stating: “On the contrary, after a long search, our country has found its true axis. The name of this axis is the “Türkiye Axis.”
Two important allies of the Türkiye Axis, both in the region and beyond, are Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Both countries have always found Türkiye standing in solidarity with them during their long-standing border disputes. One of the key catalysts for the alliance among these three actors was undoubtedly the Second Karabakh War. Ankara and Islamabad’s military and diplomatic support for Baku during the conflict laid the foundation for significant military and political cooperation in the years that followed.
Islamabad, Baku, Istanbul Declarations
Following the resolution of the Karabakh issue, the three countries signed key binding documents establishing a tripartite strategic partnership. These are the Islamabad, Baku and Istanbul Declarations, signed in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Alina Vernigora and Gleb Makarevich (2023), in their article titled Evolution and Prospects of Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan Scalene Triangle, highlight Türkiye’s leading role in the alliance with Azerbaijan and Pakistan, describing it as an “unequal triangle.” The mentioned declarations serve as the cornerstones of this strategic framework.
A tangible reflection of these declarations on the ground was the “Three Brothers Exercise,” a joint military drill conducted by Turkish, Azerbaijani and Pakistani Special Forces in Azerbaijan from Sept. 12 to 20, 2021. Although economic cooperation is not yet at the desired level, both Türkiye and Azerbaijan have placed growing importance on their financial ties with Pakistan following the declarations. The trade volume between Türkiye and Pakistan, which currently exceeds $1 billion (TL 39 billion), is targeted to reach $5 billion. Similarly, Azerbaijan and Pakistan aim to increase their trade volume to $2 billion. Given the strengthening political solidarity among the three nations, these targets are far from unrealistic. In this context, the Lachin Summit held this week is also important.
Lachin Summit
Türkiye’s foreign policy has recently been marked by a series of significant developments, including Erdoğan’s visit to Azerbaijan. On May 28, the Turkish President traveled to Azerbaijan and engaged in several key diplomatic initiatives. This date is particularly symbolic, as it marks both Azerbaijan’s Independence Day and the inauguration of Lachin Airport. It also witnessed the Türkiye-Azerbaijan-Pakistan Summit – a trilateral meeting that not only sent a strong message of solidarity to the international community but also highlighted the progress of Türkiye’s evolving foreign policy.
Much like the “Baku Victory Parade” following the Karabakh Victory, Türkiye (and specifically President Erdoğan) was prominently featured at the openings of Fuzuli, Zengilan, and now, Lachin Airports. This continued presence underscores Türkiye’s strategic importance and deepening regional ties. Another symbolic gesture was raising the Turkish flag, bearing the crescent and star, alongside Azerbaijan’s tricolour flag at Lachin Airport – an understated yet powerful visual of alliance and mutual respect.
President Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev jointly inaugurated the Lachin Airport and conveyed significant messages during the trilateral summit, including Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif. Held amid renewed tensions between Pakistan and India, the summit served as a timely demonstration of unity, with Ankara and Baku reaffirming their support for Islamabad. This gathering clearly reflects Türkiye’s strategic orientation and assertive stance in regional foreign policy.
Three states, one nation
The strategic culture of “two states, one nation,” one of the most prominent symbols of Türkiye-Azerbaijan relations, is now a recognised reality in international relations literature. The current Türkiye Axis in Turkish foreign policy extends this concept beyond the Baku-Ankara line, broadening the front of solidarity. In this context, it is quite noteworthy that Erdoğan used the phrase “three states, one nation” in his speech at the Lachin Summit.
On the other hand, Erdoğan’s concise diplomatic rhetoric, referring to the Pakistan-India tension, highlights the significance of the trilateral summit: “Developments in our region demonstrate the importance of solidarity between our countries every day. We see the development of our capacity for solidarity and joint action in the face of difficulties not as a choice but as a necessity.” A striking reflection of the Türkiye Axis at the summit was Azerbaijani President Aliyev’s statement that “thanks to the cooperation between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, the energy map of not only our region but also a wider geography has changed.” These statements, which highlight Ankara’s leading role, also point to Türkiye’s strong position both on the ground and at the negotiating table.
The glue holding together the Ankara-Baku-Islamabad trio in the Türkiye Axis is undoubtedly Türkiye’s military power, which serves as a lever for its political, economic and most importantly, defense industry in the “Century of Türkiye.” One of the most important indicators of this power is not only Türkiye’s possession of the second strongest army in NATO and the fifth strongest in the world, but also the performance of Turkish defense industry products in the Second Karabakh War and other tensions involving Pakistan. As Charles de Gaulle once said, “The sword is the axis of the world, and its power is absolute.”
Ahmet Turan
