There is a clear revival within the camp of Armenian revanchists. This time, it’s former Armenian Defense Minister Arshak Karapetyan who has made an appearance. He held a press conference at the Izvestia newspaper office, where—following Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov—he delivered an extended monologue about how greatly Russia had helped Armenia to occupy and retain Azerbaijani territories.
Commenting specifically on Lavrov’s statement that Russia had proposed leaving the issue of Karabakh’s status to future generations, Karapetyan offered his “translation from diplomatic language”: in his words, Russia was essentially acknowledging that “Karabakh is Armenia.” The Izvestia journalists also stood out, openly referring to Karabakh as “Artsakh” in their conversations with the Armenian guest.
Karapetyan not only eagerly reminded the audience of Russia’s military support to Armenia in the 1990s, but also hinted quite plainly that unless Armenia confronts Azerbaijan, it won’t receive any support from Russia.
The same theses, it’s worth noting, were recently voiced by Robert Kocharyan in his interviews.
One could theoretically interpret this as a tactical move: that Russia is concerned with Armenia’s internal situation and seeks to restore its former level of control over its outpost. With an eye on the 2026 elections (or possibly earlier—depending on how events unfold), the Kremlin may be seeking a replacement for Nikol Pashinyan. As a result, several figures in Armenia’s pro-Russian camp have become active again, including Arshak Karapetyan—who, incidentally, is wanted in his homeland. But if that’s the explanation, it’s far from the whole story.
Let’s call things by their names: Russia is openly fueling revanchist sentiments in Armenia. And it’s doing so not in anticipation of any internal political shifts within Armenia, but at a time when Moscow is extremely dissatisfied with Azerbaijan’s independence. The Kremlin still hasn’t forgotten the downing of an Azerbaijani civilian aircraft by Russian air defenses, nor has it forgiven the deportation of its MP from Baku. President Ilham Aliyev did not attend the May 9 events in Moscow, and to top it off, Azerbaijan recently received Ukraine’s foreign minister in Baku.
And perhaps most importantly: We can tell ourselves stories about a “cognac pipeline” from Yerevan to Moscow’s corridors of power, or about “Armenian diaspora money” used to bribe officials and journalists, but in truth, Armenian aggressive expansionism has not merely been supported by Moscow—it was engineered by it. From the very start.
It all began after the Treaty of Turkmenchay, when Russia initiated the organized resettlement of ethnic Armenians from Persia and the Ottoman Empire to historical Azerbaijani territories of the Irevan and Karabakh khanates. Armenia’s leadership, with its territorial ambitions toward neighboring countries, was from the outset meant to serve as a Russian proxy—primarily in its conflict with the Ottoman Empire.
One need only recall the events leading up to and during World War I: legal cases against Dashnak terrorists were brushed aside, while armed Dashnak detachments were formed and used against the Ottomans. In reality, they mostly looted and murdered civilians rather than engage in military operations. But in return, the Armenian elite were rewarded with Azerbaijani lands. The indigenous Azerbaijani population was expelled—if they were lucky not to be killed outright.
During the collapse of the Russian Empire, Dashnak forces were absorbed into the Red Army almost without formal integration and continued their terror against peaceful Muslim populations. The Bolshevik-Dashnak unity during the March 1918 massacre in Baku is a well-known but far from unique example.
The Bolsheviks continued this policy. In the 1920s, Western Zangezur and the Goycha (Sevan) region were gifted to Armenia, and Armenian autonomy was established in Upper Karabakh. In 1944 and again in the 1950s, several waves of deportation of ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia occurred, not to mention the slow “squeezing out” between those waves.
Starting in 1963, the USSR began financing the “Armenian lobby,” which suddenly became wealthy and influential. They began to push the idea of the “Armenian Genocide”—previously referred to simply as a “massacre.” The term “genocide” implies state responsibility. And it didn’t matter that there had never been such a genocide. Armenia even erected a monument to the “genocide victims,” clearly hinting at territorial claims against Turkey. Such moves would have been impossible without Moscow’s backing.
Armenian terrorist groups grew stronger, with the KGB actively using them to establish links with the international terrorist scene—primarily through the KGB of the Armenian SSR. This allowed Moscow to later shift blame onto spontaneous nationalist zeal within Armenia if needed.
By the mid-1980s, the first pogroms against Azerbaijanis had already swept across Armenia—with no one held accountable. In 1988, a new phase began: open claims to Karabakh and the total ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis from Armenia. Moscow stood fully behind its Armenian proxies. Martial law and curfews were imposed in Baku—not in Yerevan. No steps were taken to stop the ethnic cleansing of Azerbaijanis, either in Armenia or in Karabakh.
After the collapse of the USSR, the Kremlin openly supported Armenia militarily. This included not only arms shipments—recently confirmed by Sergey Lavrov—but also regular Russian military units that fought on the side of Armenian aggressors. The most infamous example is the 366th Motor Rifle Regiment stationed in Khankendi. Likewise, units from the 7th Soviet Army, based in Armenia, fought alongside Armenian forces.
Let us also recall again: it was Russia’s elite Pskov Airborne Division that opened the Lachin corridor for Armenia. That division didn’t just show up in Karabakh for a few bottles of cognac.
Armenian war criminals like Kocharyan and Sargsyan—long considered Moscow’s agents—still fly regularly to the Kremlin for instructions on how best to fight Azerbaijan. These instructions surely came with intelligence data. Later, Armenia would receive weapons from Russia as “gifts” worth $800 million to $1 billion—loans that Russia would itself issue and then forgive, and even throw in extra support beyond those credits.
Now Moscow clearly wants to “try again.” And once again, it is betting on the same revanchist forces, making the same hints and issuing the same promises.
But here’s the problem. This “we can do it again” strategy was already tried in Karabakh—in the fall of 2020, right before the Southern Gas Corridor was scheduled to go online (something Moscow greatly disliked). Back then, too, military cargo flights delivered weapons from Moscow to Yerevan. Armenian parades showcased Iskander missiles—the very ones later used to strike Shusha. Militants were funneled to Armenia through the Khmeimim base in Syria, under the guise of “volunteers.” Who knows what other agreements and “support measures” were in place?
Clearly, both in Yerevan and Moscow, they were counting on a repeat of the early 1990s, when Azerbaijani defense consisted mainly of self-defense units and volunteers, armed at best with RPGs and repurposed meteorological rockets.
Instead, Armenian aggressors were met by a capital-A Army—trained, equipped with modern weapons, and highly motivated. Grand plans to capture Ganja, Terter, Barda, Gabala, to reach the Kura River and cut pipeline routes—all collapsed. The “whoever Moscow helps wins” scenario failed back then.
It failed again in autumn 2023, when Azerbaijan launched its “local blitzkrieg,” destroying a 10,000-strong Armenian grouping in less than 24 hours—along with hundreds of armored vehicles, artillery systems, and electronic warfare units.
So, any attempts to replay the 1990s scenario would be unwise. These are not the 1990s anymore. The balance of power has changed dramatically—and there is little chance of repeating the past. Conclusions about which forces Moscow is backing—and why—are already being drawn.
Nurani
Translated from minval.az
