On May 4, an Azerbaijani delegation of state officials arrived in Damascus at the invitation of the interim Syrian government. Vice Prime Minister Samir Sharifov, who led the delegation, was received by Syria’s transitional President, Ahmad Al-Sharaa. The delegations discussed opportunities for collaboration in key areas, including the economy, energy, culture, and education. The visit followed a meeting between Al-Sharaa and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev in Turkey at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, where the two leaders explored the potential for closer ties.
The growing diplomatic communication between Azerbaijan and Syria in the post-Assad period reflects Baku’s recalibrating foreign policy and pragmatic engagement with the Middle East as well as opportunities presented by the collapse of a Damascus government that had tilted toward Baku’s rival, Armenia. Since the toppling of Assad’s regime in December, Azerbaijan has become one of a handful of Muslim countries, including Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, that have established formal ties with the new Islamist authorities in Damascus, dispatching humanitarian aid and offering assistance in post-war reconstruction. In December 2024 and January 2025, Azerbaijan sent aid to Syria’s most vulnerable regions with the support of Turkey. Azerbaijani state officials, including the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of energy, and the head of the State Oil Company (SOCAR), have also held meetings with Syrian officials on the sidelines of international events.
In the last few years, Azerbaijan has significantly boosted its footprint in the Middle East by deepening ties with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, Oman, and Syria, mainly through SOCAR-led investments and partnerships. Indeed, despite the ongoing volatility and security risks, the oil company has steadily become an effective tool of Azerbaijani soft power.
The new Syrian authorities have moved to shore up domestic stability by inking a deal with ethnic Kurdish militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces, incorporating them into the new government’s regular forces. However, domestic stability remains fragile in a country long wracked by civil war, particularly in southern Syria along the Israel border. Israel’s recent incursion into Syrian territories beyond the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and frequent air raids near Damascus undermine the new authorities’ efforts to unify the country and also interfere with Turkish plans to establish a long-term military presence on Syrian soil.
Given this situation, officially, Damascus seems enthusiastic about boosting its partnership with Azerbaijan, considering Baku a useful interlocutor and partner given its deep strategic ties to both Israel and Turkey. Israel is hoping to entice Baku into joining the Abraham Accords, while Syrian officials see Azerbaijan as a viable actor and potential mediator between Syria and Israel as well as between Israel and Turkey. Lacking both military and economic power, the new Syrian authorities are in no position to prevent Israel from striking Syrian targets at will and thus are seeking the support of external powers.
On April 11, Azerbaijan announced that it had convened Israel-Turkey talks in Baku, followed by a second meeting on May 8 focused on addressing Israeli security concerns in Syria and reducing tensions. The talks aim to establish a joint military coordination mechanism to prevent accidental clashes in Syria.
Azerbaijan’s assistance to the new Syrian authorities has gone further. On April 25, Baku arranged a meeting of Syrian intelligence officials with the head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Sergey Narishkin. Russia is seeking to retain ties and military bases in Syria despite the demise of a four-decade-old alliance with the Assads, father and son.
Azerbaijan still faces some significant constraints in terms of a comprehensive partnership with al-Sharaa’s government. These include U.S. sanctions that complicate formal investments in state-controlled sectors, Syria’s economic collapse, and persistent insecurity that also deters Azerbaijan from starting long-term projects in Syria. However, during his visit to Saudi Arabia on May 14, President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would lift sanctions on Syria, giving a nation devastated by years of ruinous civil war a crucial opening to revive its shattered economy. Such a U-turn in U.S. foreign policy would facilitate Azerbaijan’s ambitions to engage in energy-related infrastructure projects in Syria, particularly in renewable energy and onshore oil fields that were neglected for many years due to the Syrian civil war. While concrete investment figures remain unspecified, the ongoing diplomatic engagements indicate a significant potential Azerbaijani role in Syria’s recovery efforts.
Azerbaijan seems committed to constructing a partnership with Syria as part of Baku’s pivot toward the Middle East. Considering the fragility of the regional order, Azerbaijan will likely stick with the energy agenda in partnership with Syria, while the latter will push for SOCAR investments in the post-war reconstruction period. Syria’s willingness to have SOCAR-owned infrastructure on its soil may also be intended to deter Israeli air strikes on its territories, as Tel Aviv might be reluctant to target Azerbaijani assets. Such a scenario would enhance the Azerbaijan-Syria-Israel negotiation format as part of Baku’s mediation efforts between Damascus and Tel Aviv to settle their border conflict.
A greater Azerbaijani role in Syria could help Damascus navigate between Turkey, Israel, Iran, and even Russia. Effective mediation between Israel, Turkey, and Syria would also boost Baku’s value to the Trump administration.
Fuad Shahbazov is a policy analyst covering regional security issues in the South Caucasus and a former research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies and senior analyst at the Center for Strategic Communications in Azerbaijan.
