Azerbaijani Presidential Assistant Hikmet Hajiyev and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a meeting, which The Jerusalem Post described as a “turning point” in regional politics.
According to sources, the meeting took place just 48 hours after Netanyahu’s dialogue with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, indicating a growing momentum toward Azerbaijan’s potential inclusion in the Abraham Accords. The publication also highlighted Azerbaijan’s strategic importance in regional plans under the new U.S. administration’s interests in Israel and the expansion of security cooperation.
In an interview with Minval.az, Azerbaijani political analyst and Milli Majlis (National Assembly) deputy Rasim Musabayov shared his views on the implications of these developments, the potential impact on Section 907, and whether this activity should be linked to increasing interactions between Iran and Russia, as well as threats from Tehran.
Azerbaijan Has Moved Beyond the Abraham Accords Framework
Musabayov expressed skepticism about Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the Abraham Accords, emphasizing that the accords primarily focus on Arab states normalizing diplomatic and economic relations with Israel. He noted that while Saudi Arabia is expected to join, Jordan and Egypt already maintain formal relations with Israel, while the UAE and Morocco have established diplomatic ties.
“Azerbaijan, however, not only established diplomatic relations with Israel long ago but has elevated them to the level of a strategic partnership. We are so far ahead in our relations with Israel that Abraham Accords participants will have to catch up with us for decades. Therefore, Azerbaijan’s inclusion in the accords would only serve as an example of how to build a strategic partnership with Israel. Beyond that, Azerbaijan has long surpassed the framework outlined in the Abraham Accords,” Musabayov explained.
Azerbaijan-U.S. Relations Under the New Administration
Commenting on Azerbaijan’s potential role in the new U.S. administration’s regional strategy, Musabayov noted that while Azerbaijan maintains a robust political and economic dialogue with Israel, such engagement with the U.S. is not yet at the necessary level.
“It’s difficult to say whether Azerbaijan fits into the U.S. administration’s strategy regarding Israel. Not everything should be orchestrated at Washington’s command. Fortunately, Azerbaijan and Israel build their relationship independently, regardless of which administration is in the White House,” he added.
Musabayov reminded that the Biden administration had been unfriendly toward Azerbaijan, yet Baku continued to develop its relations with Israel without regard for Washington’s stance. “I believe this approach will persist.”
“It’s possible that the new U.S. administration will treat Azerbaijan’s position with more respect. Enhanced engagement, including in the context of Azerbaijan-Israel relations, could positively impact Azerbaijan-U.S. relations. However, this remains an open question that requires further assessment,” he said.
The Symbolic Nature of Section 907
Addressing Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which restricts U.S. aid to Azerbaijan, Musabayov downplayed its significance, calling it symbolic:
“In reality, Azerbaijan does not need U.S. assistance. Azerbaijan is a self-sufficient country with substantial financial resources. A few tens of millions of dollars in U.S. military aid would be more beneficial for their own strategic interests. If they withhold it—so be it. If they decide they need Azerbaijan, they will approach us themselves.”
He criticized Washington’s inconsistent application of Section 907, stating, “Azerbaijan will not allow itself to be blackmailed by its suspension and reinstatement.”
Azerbaijan’s Strategic Importance Amid Iran-Russia Cooperation
Musabayov pointed out that Azerbaijan is taken seriously in Washington, Moscow, and European capitals for two key reasons:
Iran and Regional Security – Potential military actions against Iran could impact Azerbaijan, making the country a key player in regional security considerations.
Trans-Caspian Projects and Geopolitical Connectivity – Azerbaijan’s role as a hub in East-West and North-South transportation and energy routes gives it significant geopolitical weight.
“Baku assesses these projects based on its own economic and security interests,” he emphasized.
Regarding growing Iran-Russia cooperation, Musabayov described it as “situational,” pointing to deep-seated Iranian distrust of Moscow.
“Despite signing a strategic partnership agreement, Russia openly seeks to exploit Iran for its own interests. Moscow values Iran as a transit route to warm waters, such as the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. However, whether Russia can fully implement these projects remains uncertain. Additionally, if Iran improves its relations with Western countries, its long-term interest in close ties with Moscow is questionable.”
He highlighted that Iran is economically more connected to China and India and is eager to escape sanctions and restore trade with Western Europe.
“In all scenarios, Azerbaijan occupies a pivotal position between Russia and Iran, enhancing its geopolitical significance in the eyes of both Tehran and Moscow,” Musabayov concluded.
