U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken personally devoted significant time and effort to this goal. However, these efforts proved counterproductive, with Blinken’s mission failing as Washington’s negotiation platform became inactive last year, and talks between Baku and Yerevan shifted to a direct format.
Despite these setbacks, the U.S. administration and President Joe Biden himself continued to push for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, even in the run-up to the U.S. presidential elections, which saw the Democrats suffer defeat.
In late October, President Biden sent personal letters to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, urging them to finalize a peace agreement by the end of the year. Biden even dispatched Michael Carpenter, a senior National Security Council representative, to deliver letters and proposals addressing unresolved points in the draft peace agreement.
Direct negotiations between Baku and Yerevan resulted in agreement on 15 out of 17 points of the draft, prompting Biden to call for the deal to be signed by the end of 2024. However, Biden’s intervention came at a time when his approval ratings were plummeting, while Donald Trump’s victory seemed almost certain. Facing challenges such as failing to stop the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, Biden likely hoped to secure a diplomatic win by brokering peace in the South Caucasus.
However, preparations for the COP29 global climate summit in Baku caused a pause in negotiations between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Hikmet Hajiyev, an aide to the Azerbaijani president, announced that talks would resume after the summit’s conclusion.
The situation worsened at the annual OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting in early December in Malta, where Blinken’s attempt to facilitate talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian foreign ministers failed. This was primarily due to a U.S.-led media and political campaign criticizing the COP29 summit in Baku. In response, Azerbaijan refused to engage in negotiations with Armenian representatives under U.S. mediation.
At that point, many believed the White House’s failed mission, along with Blinken’s involvement, had reached its conclusion. However, Blinken seems unwilling to give up. Vedant Patel, a State Department spokesperson, recently stated that resolving Azerbaijani-Armenian relations remains a priority for both Washington and Blinken. “We do not dwell on disappointments; we keep working,” Patel said, emphasizing the administration’s commitment until its final days in office.
Patel’s remarks were particularly odd given Baku’s open disinterest in working with the outgoing U.S. administration. Azerbaijani officials have made it clear that they neither want direct nor indirect U.S. involvement in peace talks. President Aliyev’s comments in an interview with Russia’s “Sputnik” agency encapsulated this sentiment: “Any assistance should not be intrusive. Biden’s administration will be remembered for many things, including its intrusiveness. They say, ‘We want to help you.’ And we reply, ‘No, thank you!’ But they insist, ‘We want to!’ They have this USAID, which keeps wanting to help—but not where we need it.”
Currently, Baku is focused on building relations with Donald Trump’s administration, emphasizing non-interference in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs and mutual cooperation on shared interests. In a congratulatory letter to Trump, President Aliyev highlighted the successful cooperation during Trump’s first term and expressed readiness to continue it.
It is evident that if the U.S. hopes to play a role in fostering peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, such efforts will likely only succeed under a Trump administration. As for Biden’s South Caucasus diplomacy, Baku views it as a failure and a closed chapter in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations, with no intention of revisiting it. Any attempts by Blinken to revive this policy are expected to be ignored by Azerbaijan.
Farhad Mammadov
Translated from haqqin.az
