As noted in the statement of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the actions of the Polish president took place despite Azerbaijan’s prior efforts to prevent his participation in the “binocular show.”
This is not an ordinary event and therefore deserves attention. The formal side of the Polish president’s visit to the Azerbaijan-Armenia border was that a Polish representative serves as the deputy head of the EU observation mission on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. However, even if the Polish president merely decided to visit his “compatriot” at the border, he could have limited himself to a meeting, perhaps taking a photo with him and other members of the observation mission, but not picking up binoculars and peering into Azerbaijani territory for unclear reasons. Thus, it is undeniable that the actions of the Polish president reflect a certain démarche. This démarche represents the European Union’s unequivocal support for Armenia, demonstrated through various actions taken against Azerbaijan.
The key word here is “unequivocal.” Take note: no EU government or leading media outlet in these countries criticized Armenia’s absence from the COP29 summit in Baku. On the contrary, Azerbaijan faced criticism for refusing to release detained separatist leaders. Several EU member states are providing military aid to Armenia. Naturally, every country has the right to defense, and every country or alliance may provide military supplies to others. However, the problem is that this EU stance and that of individual member states embolden Armenia, hindering the signing of a peace agreement and the establishment of lasting peace between the two nations.
Had this military-political support for Armenia been paired with pressure on Yerevan to conclude peace with Baku on the terms proposed by Azerbaijan, it would have been “conditional” support. Instead, the Polish president’s “binocular show” signifies continued pressure on Azerbaijan to conclude peace with Armenia on “Armenian” terms, i.e., without dismantling the Minsk Group, without Armenian society renouncing revanchist ideas and aggression against Azerbaijan, and without guaranteeing unrestricted communication between Nakhchivan and mainland Azerbaijan.
It is well known that Duda is a practicing Catholic, and it is appropriate to recall Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan’s recent meeting with the Pope. Duda also maintains good relations with President Trump from the latter’s first term. Amid three much more serious challenges for Trump’s future administration—the war in Ukraine, conflicts in the Middle East, and tensions with China—Trump and his new team might develop the illusion that the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, seemingly less complex, can be resolved quickly.
In my opinion, this illusion will dissipate quickly. Azerbaijan is currently in a much more advantageous geopolitical and regional position than during the 30-year occupation of Karabakh and the 44-day war. In other words, the chances of “bending” Azerbaijan are close to zero. However, as we can see, attempts are being made and will continue.
Azerbaijan’s military and economic strength is critical. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan does not rely on external financial aid or free military supplies. Armenia holds no geopolitical interest for the West comparable to that of Ukraine. Therefore, Armenia will not receive assistance sufficient to establish military parity with Azerbaijan. The economies of most Western countries are not thriving, and their citizens accustomed to high living standards are pressuring their politicians. There are not enough resources to provide significant aid to Armenia, making it impossible to force Azerbaijan into accepting peace on Armenian terms.
Attempts to create internal divisions within Azerbaijani society are doomed to fail. As demonstrated during the 44-day war, all layers of Azerbaijani society, including opposition parties and experts, supported the government’s actions concerning the nation’s sovereignty and resistance to Armenian aggression.
Moreover, Azerbaijan’s geographical position on critical trade routes (North-South and East-West) compels even major powers to consider its interests. France, reliant on nuclear energy, faces a shrinking supply of uranium from its overseas territories and depends on transit through Azerbaijan for Kazakh and Uzbek supplies due to sanctions on Iran and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Similarly, Poland shows interest in contributing to reconstruction efforts in Karabakh.
In summary, Azerbaijan is not to blame for the current misunderstanding with Poland. Its responses are defensive and measured, staying within the “red lines” of international relations. Should Poland refrain from similar actions in the future, Azerbaijan’s stance would promptly adjust.
Chingiz Mammadov
Translated from minval.az
