September 2024 marks the fourth anniversary of the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 10, 2020), as well as the first anniversary of Azerbaijan’s “anti-terror operation” against the Armenian separatist contingency in the Karabakh region on September 19–20, 2023 (see EDM, September 28, December 14, 2020, September 20, 28, October 4, 2023). As a result of these two military incidents, Armenia and Azerbaijan are drafting a peace treaty in an effort to reconcile the longtime adversaries. The basis for negotiations were proposals put forward by Azerbaijan in March 2022, centered around key principles such as the recognition of each other’s territorial integrity and the non-use of force (see EDM, April 14, 2022, January 24, April 15, May 21, July 9). “Today … peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not only possible but within reach,” said Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan optimistically on September 26 at the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City (Primeminister.am, September 26). Yet, both Pashinyan and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov at the UNGA acknowledged the significant challenges that remain. While the treaty could be within reach, it may still be out of grasp.
Baku remains highly steadfast in its demand that Armenia should remove territorial claims against Azerbaijan before the two countries can sign a peace treaty (see EDM, June 25). “The Armenian people should constitutionally declare an end to their utopian claims of uniting Karabakh with Armenia and express their intention to live in peace with Azerbaijan,” said Hikmat Hajiyev, foreign policy adviser to the Azerbaijani president on September 18 (Report.az, September 18). Bayramov argued that the “pain and [suffering] inflicted by irredentism and territorial claims” make it imperative for Azerbaijan to seek assurances that revanchist forces in Armenia will not revive hostilities, during his speech to the UNGA (Mfa.gov.az, September 29). Although Pashinyan acknowledged the need for a constitutional change in Armenia earlier this year, this seems unlikely to happen before 2027 (see EDM, June 25).
During his UNGA speech, Pashinyan attempted to assure the international community that Armenia’s constitution would not contradict the proposed peace treaty, and if Armenia’s Constitutional Court found otherwise before the start of the ratification process, then Yerevan would attempt to change its constitution (see EDM, January 31). Pashinyan suggested that a peace treaty could be signed at the present stage based on the 13 articles that had been agreed to (out of 17), in the hopes that later negotiations resolve the four remaining issues. While Pashinyan spoke generally of the articles agreed upon already (e.g., recognition of each other’s territorial integrity, non-use of force, non-interference in domestic affairs, etc.), neither he nor the Azerbaijani side has disclosed the content of the remaining four articles (see EDM, September 11).
This proposal was not smiled upon by Baku. “‘Partial peace’ is not an option,” said Bayramov at the UNGA (Mfa.gov.az, September 28). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev stated on September 23 that the provisions that Armenia suggested be removed from the peace treaty are important and “without them, the peace treaty will be incomplete” (Apa.az, September 23).
From the Azerbaijani side, the two countries’ recent past is deemed to be a reason for distrust. According to the Aliyev government, complicating factors include: Armenia’s rapid militarization (see EDM, August 6, September 12); revanchist rhetoric within Armenian political and social circles (see EDM, May 14, June 5); delays in peace treaty negotiations (see EDM, July 22); inadequate proposals, such as the aforementioned removal of unresolved articles from the treaty; and occasional efforts to internationalize the Karabakh issue (Apa.az, September 23). These are seen as signs of Armenia’s reluctance to achieve peace on the terms being offered out of a desire to buy time. Reports from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense concerning sporadic Armenian gunfire targeting Azerbaijani military positions along their border further underscore the unstable and unpredictable situation between the two countries (Mod.gov.az, September 29). The trilateral meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani foreign ministers, mediated by the United States on the sidelines of the 79th UNGA session, also appears to have failed to achieve a breakthrough (State.gov, September 26).
Baku is also concerned that external actors, namely France, are attempting to use Armenia against Azerbaijan as a part of their broader geopolitical agendas. “The fact that certain Western countries with a colonial past are using Armenia to promote their policies and intrigues in the Caucasus, as they did in Africa, is producing the opposite effect,” Hajiyev said in an interview with the Italian media (Azertag, September 27).
The current situation suggests that Baku and Yerevan will be unable to sign a peace treaty in the upcoming months. It is an open question, however, as to whether they will sign an interim agreement soon or during the United Nations Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC/COP 29), to be held from November 11 to 22 in Baku. In July, Hajiyev told Reuters that such a document could serve as a temporary measure, laying the foundation for bilateral relations and ensuring neighborly ties between the two countries (Reuters, July 21). The interim document proposed by the Azerbaijani side differs from Pashinyan’s proposed peace treaty. As Hajiyev noted, it is explicitly seen as a “temporary measure” that reflects the two sides’ commitment to fundamental principles. He further expressed that an interim document could be signed in November.
Despite challenging and uncertain moments in the recent history of Baku-Yerevan relations, there have also been some constructive developments that underscore a willingness to overcome the remaining obstacles toward signing a peace treaty. For example, on August 30, Baku and Yerevan signed the “Regulation … concerning the joint activities of the State Commission[s] on the delimitation of the state border between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia” (Azertag, August 30). The importance of this document cannot be understated. At the UNGA, Pashinyan pointed out that “[t]his is the first bilateral legal document signed between the parties. But what is more important in this document is that Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to accept the Alma-Ata Declaration of 1991 as the main principle for delimiting the border between the two countries and will be guided by it” (Primeminister.am, September 26). [1] It remains to be seen whether the two countries can seize on the potential for peace and reconciliation and open a new chapter in their relationship.
Notes:
[1] Following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Almaty was changed to its Kazakh name from the Russian version, Alma-Ata.
