As previously reported, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement that Armenia is sabotaging the agreement to open transportation links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan (the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”) has caused noticeable concern in Tehran.
On August 2, the head of the Eurasian Department of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Mojtaba Demirchili, summoned Alexey Dedov, the Russian ambassador to Tehran, to the ministry. He informed him that “any change to internationally recognized borders and the geopolitical status quo in the South Caucasus is unacceptable.”
During the conversation with the senior Russian diplomat, Demirchili “emphasized the importance of considering the interests and legitimate concerns of all regional countries.”
It is well known that Iran initially opposed the opening of the “Zangezur Corridor” and even concentrated military forces along its border with Azerbaijan, signaling its readiness to use military force if necessary.
Subsequently, tensions between Baku and Tehran eased somewhat, with both sides normalizing relations and focusing on opening new transportation routes between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Iranian territory. In Tehran, these routes are referred to as the “Araz Road.” As a result, negotiations over the opening of the “Zangezur Corridor” were temporarily suspended.
Nevertheless, even though the “Araz Road” project was agreed upon and formalized by Azerbaijan and Armenia in a treaty in March 2022, official Tehran continues to oppose the “Zangezur Corridor” project whenever possible. On July 30 of this year, during a meeting in Tehran with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei explicitly stated that Tehran considers the project “harmful” to Armenia and continues to hold this position.
Amid recent remarks by the special representative of the Azerbaijani president on special assignments, Elchin Amirbekov, that the issue of the “Zangezur Corridor” or other transportation links connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan through Armenian territory has been excluded from the bilateral negotiations agenda and will be addressed after the peace treaty is signed, it seemed that the issue, which so worries Iran, had been temporarily resolved.
However, during Vladimir Putin’s visit to Baku, the topic of the corridor regained sharp political significance. As reported, Sergey Lavrov reminded that Armenia had violated its commitments regarding the corridor under the trilateral statement of November 10, 2020.
In response, Yerevan reacted sharply, stating that the Russian Foreign Minister’s “reminder” once again proves the impossibility of Russia acting as a mediator in Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations on both the peace agreement and border communication issues.
Following this, the Russian Foreign Ministry made public some details of the trilateral negotiations on the “Zangezur Corridor.” Specifically, it was revealed that Armenia, citing various pretexts, had retreated from the previously reached agreement, refused to allow Russian border guards to control the corridor, and also rejected the construction of a road along the railway line between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, proposing an alternative route instead.
It is worth noting that before Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan, Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu visited Tehran and then Baku. Analysts believe that one of the topics discussed in Iran, and later in Azerbaijan, may have been the “Zangezur Corridor.” Now, given Iran’s stern message conveyed to the Russian ambassador in Tehran, it seems that Shoigu was unable to reach a compromise. Despite Iran’s recent close cooperation with Russia, including in matters of political influence in the South Caucasus, the Islamic Republic does not agree with the “Zangezur Corridor” being under the control of Russian border guards.
Does Iran want the opening of transportation routes through Zangezur, which would connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan at all? This is not only a legitimate question but also a fundamental one, as it concerns the direct land connection between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which clearly does not suit Iran. If the corridor through Armenia’s territory is controlled by Russian border guards, Turkey would still be able to strengthen its role in the region, using its close and allied relations with Azerbaijan.
Another strategic factor influencing Tehran’s position is that Iran views Zangezur as an outlet to the Black Sea through Armenia and Georgia’s territories. Therefore, any potential control over it by Russia is seen as a direct threat to Iranian interests.
Finally, Iran is concerned that the opening of the “Zangezur Corridor” would weaken its current control over transportation links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan. Tehran sees this control as an important lever of influence, which is part of the geopolitical status quo in the South Caucasus region.
Considering all these factors, it can be concluded that Iran is not interested in the creation of the “Zangezur Corridor,” even if it were to be fully controlled by Armenia.
Do Armenia’s interests align with Iran on this issue? Of course not! The transportation links known as the “Zangezur Corridor” are critically important to Yerevan itself, which seeks to break out of regional isolation. While Armenia firmly rejects Russian control over these communications, its representatives have repeatedly stated that the opening of the corridor is even more important for Yerevan than for Baku.
It is worth recalling that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s “Crossroads of the World” concept is based on opening transportation links between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, as well as creating transport connections between Armenia, Iran, Turkey, and Russia through Azerbaijan’s territory.
Currently, the main point of contention is the issue of Armenia’s customs and border control over the roads connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. One possible solution could be to transfer these functions to a neutral private company. Recently, Nikol Pashinyan stated that Armenia is ready to open a road connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan while preserving its territorial integrity and sovereignty. Regarding additional security functions, according to the Armenian side, they could be performed by a private company from a third country.
It is important to note the words of Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan, who told reporters that if the security function is transferred to a private company, Armenian border guards and customs officers will still be present at the border. However, their direct involvement in border control would depend on the “details,” and there are currently no preliminary agreements on this idea.
Thus, the “Zangezur Corridor” is not only a source of tension in relations between Iran and Azerbaijan, as well as between Iran and Russia, but also a cause of certain disagreements between Iran and Armenia. Although Tehran and Yerevan try not to display this publicly, Ali Khamenei’s statement that the “Zangezur Corridor” is “harmful” to Armenia can be seen as a warning to the Armenian side.
Following this, Iran is trying to prevent Russia from increasing pressure on Armenia regarding the “Zangezur Corridor.”
Farhad Mammadov
Translated from haqqin.az
