The summit features plenary sessions, bilateral meetings, and more. We will intentionally exclude the Bayramov-Blinken-Mirzoyan talks as they constitute a separate topic. What is important here are the notable developments in the Azerbaijan-NATO relationship.
In the early 1990s, when the term “Euro-Atlantic integration” sounded almost like a magical incantation, Brussels spoke of the alliance’s “open doors” for new members, created the “Partnership for Peace” program, and North Atlantic Alliance leaders visited post-Soviet states. Many thought joining NATO was not that difficult and that all one had to do was express a desire to join. They wondered why Azerbaijan, unlike Georgia, Ukraine, or the Baltic states, did not express a desire to join NATO. Some even offered “explanations” about insufficient democracy, without clarifying how Portugal under Salazar or Greece during the “colonels’ junta” joined NATO.
In reality, for objective reasons, Azerbaijan could not then and cannot now claim full NATO membership. Formally, there is no prohibition against admitting countries with territorial conflicts to NATO—it’s a matter of political will. However, against the backdrop of Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territories, joining NATO seemed too illusory. Today, Azerbaijan has successfully restored its territorial integrity, but another, much more serious obstacle remains. To remind, for NATO membership, a country must have either access to the open sea (the enclosed Caspian Sea does not count) or a long border with a NATO member. Therefore, Azerbaijan could join NATO either by waiting for Georgia to join the alliance or by somehow unblocking Nakhchivan. Announcing such a bid, knowing that Brussels could not accept it even if it wanted to, and risking Moscow’s wrath, is not a smart tactic.
However, Azerbaijan has the Shusha Declaration, which established a military alliance between Baku and Ankara—Turkey, remember, is a NATO member and a key element of its southern flank. Moreover, Azerbaijan has openly declared its aim to bring its army up to Turkish Armed Forces standards, which are NATO standards. According to many experts, the Azerbaijani army is closer to NATO standards than, for example, the Georgian army, despite Georgia’s official declaration of its desire to join the alliance. Besides Turkey, Azerbaijan has signed about 10 strategic partnership agreements with countries that are members of both the EU and NATO.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that Azerbaijan actively participated in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. During NATO operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan’s logistical support, use of its airspace, and airports were crucial. Some experts even believe that Armenian missile strikes on Ganja, targeting the Ganja airport, aimed at a vital NATO air corridor.
Today, the NATO contingent has left Afghanistan, but the North Atlantic Alliance’s interest in Azerbaijan has not waned. The June meetings at NATO headquarters with Hikmet Hajiyev, assistant to the Azerbaijani president, are evidence of this. In March of this year, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Azerbaijan. Notably, during this visit, Azerbaijan was the only country in Stoltenberg’s Caucasus tour where he met not only with the president or prime minister but also held a separate meeting with the defense minister. Azerbaijan’s victory in Karabakh clearly demonstrated how the military balance of power in the region has changed. Furthermore, during that visit, Stoltenberg highlighted Azerbaijan’s role in the energy security of NATO countries.
In short, Azerbaijan, which is part of the Non-Aligned Movement and truly pursues a multi-vector policy, remains a valuable partner for the North Atlantic Alliance. This is well understood in both Brussels and Washington.
Nurani
Translated from Minval.az
