Developments and incidents on the ground tend to distract from focusing on the more important issues.
This appears to be the case at the moment as Armenia and Azerbaijan continue to seek an end to decades of conflict and hostility and move to a new era of peace.
Most of the territorial issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan have now been resolved. Azerbaijan has pretty much restored its territory back to where it was in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union was dissolved, and independent Armenia, and independent Azerbaijan emerged. There remain some issues, but emotionally important as they are for both sides, they are in the greater scheme of things, secondary. Indeed, border demarcation given the Soviet legacy is always going to be a thankless task, and some issues are best dealt with once there is a minimum level of trust between the sides. This will take time and one wonders if all issues can realistically be resolved, even over a decade of negotiations. The leadership in Baku and Yerevan need therefore to focus on the big picture.
On the ground, both sides appear to be jittery. There are mutual accusations, and some incidents, though remarkably few given everything.
Related, but separate, is Armenia’s resilience, and the fate of its government led by Nikol Pashinyan. Armenia was shaken from its foundations as a result of the military defeat in the 2020, 44 day Karabakh War; it was further demoralised by the Azerbaijani military operation in Karabakh in September 2023, which resulted in the exodus of the entire Armenian population of Karabakh.
Pashinyan was seen in December 2020 as a dead man walking, but through sheer willpower he turned the situation round, winning an election in the process. He remains however under heavy domestic pressure from the political and academic elites, who never saw Pashinyan as one of their own. To add to this the Armenian government currently has very strained relations with Armenia’s traditional ally, Russia. The Armenian government, and most Armenians, accuse Russia of not coming to Armenia’s assistance in 2020, and of failing to honour its obligations to the Armenian population of Karabakh in 2023, despite having a military presence on the ground. There are signs that Russia is trying to instigate opposition against Pashinyan, using the many tools that it has at its disposal in Armenia.
The West has been concerned about Armenia’s current vulnerability. A series of measures since 2021 have sought to stabilise the Armenian economy, provide some oversight of events on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, and more opaquely up to now, boost Armenia’s security. On Friday, 5 April Prime Minister Pashinyan will meet in Brussels with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen. Excitement about this meeting in Yerevan is at a fever pitch. Azerbaijan has declared that this meeting is aimed against it, and asked that it be postponed. That will not happen but amongst more sober elements in Brussels and Washington, there is a realisation that misperception may lead to a more complicated situation. Blinken spoke to Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev on Wednesday (3 April) to try to reassure him – unsuccessfully it seems – but that was the right thing to do. One wonders why the EU has not done it too?
From Friday’s meeting, Armenia will get comfort from some reassuring statements, and a handsome package of assistance. It will be a boost for Pashinyan, but that will not stop his critics in saying that what was received was not enough. Russia may become even more aggressive.
Which is why the most important issue remains that of a peace agreement. This will enable a whole set of other developments, including the opening of borders, to come into play. Aliyev and Pashinyan must remain focused on finishing the job. And the first and most important task of the international community is to support them in this. Anything done or said that harms the prospects for peace, even if it is well-intentioned, should be avoided.
