In the run-up to the meeting in Moscow, Nikol Pashinyan recognized the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but certain circles in Armenia are not happy about it. What do you think about tomorrow’s meeting of the leaders in Moscow and what are your expectations from it?
We understand that Armenia is being subjected to a certain pressure. On the whole, the process is going in the right direction. Regarding territorial integrity, I want us to be very clear about the essence of the problem. Recognition of territorial integrity, even of Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, does not yet mean recognition of the sovereignty of our country. The Armenians claim that they recognized our country’s territorial integrity back in 1991. But they continue to interfere in our internal affairs, even after 2020. They allocate budget to paramilitary organizations that pursue their policy of annexation of Karabakh to Armenia. That is, we see a discrepancy between words and deeds. That is, attempts at annexation continue. Therefore, Nikol Pashinyan must clarify both his statements and actions. Will Armenia stop meddling in our internal affairs and respect our sovereignty? That is why I cannot say that the issue has already been resolved.
This negotiation process itself shows that the Armenian side is not ready to sign any agreements. Moreover, Pashinyan’s actions show that the Armenian side will not stop trying to annex Azerbaijani territories. Hence these doubts. Moscow offers its mediation services, competing with both Brussels and Washington.
I do not believe that Moscow will be able to resolve this situation, but the Kremlin will try to achieve some effective results. I think they may discuss the communication issue, where progress is possible. Because Armenia and Azerbaijan want the communication to work. But we know Azerbaijan’s condition that this communication should start working through the Zangezur corridor, and then only then we can talk about unblocking other communications.
On the other hand, we know that there is no technical readiness here, we know that in Brussels the EU discussed financial assistance to Armenia for the completion of a section of the Meghri road. Armenia and Azerbaijan still have disagreements over how this communication will function and what conditions will be applied to the movement of Azerbaijani citizens from one side to the other (to Nakhchivan). There is hope that the sides will work out mutually acceptable positions on this issue. Maybe Moscow will try to achieve some success in this area.
Another topic is the speedy handover of Azerbaijani soldiers who got lost and are imprisoned in Armenia.
Otherwise, I am of the opinion that we cannot expect even the signing of a framework agreement, regardless of what Pashinyan says.
If this diplomatic effort does not lead to the expected results, is another escalation possible in Karabakh or on the conditional Armenian-Azerbaijani border?
We can see that Armenia is being pressured in two directions: the first is the military pressure of Azerbaijan, and the second is the fact that even Pashinyan says none of the international mediators support Armenia’s territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Everything hinges on the extent to which the Armenian political elite is ready to return to the realities that are obvious to everyone. Only the Armenian political environment continues to delude itself, talking about some kind of revenge, while the opposition is busy trying to remove Pashinyan from office. This whole situation reminds me of the events in Egypt, when students protested at Al-Azhar University. President Anwar Sadat came there and said to the students: “Whoever wants to fight, enlist in the army.” Only 10-15 people out of the enormous number of those on strike enlisted. So, we must understand that those who are calling for revenge in Armenia do it in order to position themselves as an alternative force in Armenia’s domestic political struggle. Nor should we rule out that Pashinyan is maneuvering; he always blames his lack of political will on the public’s intransigence. I think Pashinyan is using all these processes to his advantage.
The head of Iran’s Security Council Ali Shamkhani was recently replaced. He was a very influential figure inside and outside the country; he was also against Azerbaijan. They say he supervised the IRGC and the entire shadow economy was under his control. Can we expect relations between Baku and Tehran to improve after the appointment of the new head of Iran’s Security Council?
The aggravation of relations between Azerbaijan and Iran was in the interests of certain circles in Iran, they wanted to earn points in the domestic political rivalry in the country. This is a traditional confrontation between the IRGC and the other political elite of the country. This confrontation was also there during the protests. These groups were behind these confrontations. Because circles close to the IRGC monopolized a large part of the economy and the profits from non-sanctioned oil, which is a very substantial amount. The IRGC supervised this process and, as a result, there was a situation where government agencies were financed by the IRGC, including the army, the military-industrial complex and certain ministries.
The internal political squabbles between different circles in Iran indicate a systemic crisis in the country. We know that Iran has a peculiar political system, with a constitutional structure of the state and an overlap between government agencies and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. There has always been tension between these institutions, and it has manifested itself during elections or the appointment of certain officials to various posts. Now the radical wing has won and come to power. There are “frictions” between the winners, there is a redistribution of the “pie”. But all of this points to a systemic crisis in Iran.
But should we expect improvement in Iran-Azerbaijan relations?
I think that foreign policy tools will not be engaged in resolving internal political issues. As practice shows, this did not bring dividends to the authors of the aggravation, because both Azerbaijan and Iran were well aware that the tensions could be exacerbated to a certain level. They were not ready for an open confrontation with the Azerbaijan-Türkiye tandem, and they were not ready for a number of Western countries to join this confrontation either. A common front was formed. Let’s not forget the anti-Iranian front of the Persian Gulf countries. Obviously, those who set up the tensions were not prepared for such a confrontation. So, these tensions backfired on their makers. They were unable to collect political dividends.
And the last question is about Ukraine. How will the Ukrainian war unfold? For example, it was mentioned at the G7 summit that Ukrainian pilots will be trained to fly F-16s. These aircrafts will most likely be given to Ukraine. Where do you see a way out of this conflict?
Pilot training is an expensive program, and they will definitely not be able to complete it in a few months. So, I do not see any dramatic changes on the Russian-Ukrainian front. My opinion is that there is a stalemate situation where neither side can win. The West won’t allow Ukraine to win or lose. That is why a fundamental change can happen outside of the battlefield.
Nijat Hajiyev
Translated from Minval.az
